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ABSTRACT 
In human societies, cooperation between strangers flourishes despite the risk of 
being exploited. Correct evaluation of others‟ cooperative intentions aids in selecting 
partners for profitable interactions. Assessment of intentions can be made by (a) 
considering individuals‟ reputations gained through observed interactions with others and 
third-party information (gossip) or (b) interpreting immediate cues such as facial 
expressions and body language. I empirically investigated the role reputations play in 
human economic decisions. More specifically, I addressed research questions such as (1) 
how and why people manage cooperative reputations, (2) what role reputations play in 
partner choice, (3) whether reputations can stabilize cooperation in groups, (4) whether 
people have a memory bias for specific reputations and (5) whether the ability to assess 
trustworthiness in faces relates to mind reading skills known as Theory of Mind (ToM). 
Student participants were recruited for five experiments, all involving the use of 
economic games to a greater or lesser extent. Depending on the study, participants either 
played social dilemma games in groups under various experimental conditions or 
performed individual tasks e.g. recalled information previously presented in different 
contexts or assessed photographed faces with regard to their cooperativeness and 
completed ToM tasks.  
The results provide evidence for the existence of reputation-based partner choice 
(„competitive altruism‟). Participants strategically invested in reputations and reaped 
benefits from such investments in the form of profitable interactions with the most desired 
partners. By varying endowments I demonstrated that resource inequalities affect the way 
people invest in reputation with low-resource individuals behaving in a relatively more 
generous way than their high-resource counterparts. Moreover, I showed that cooperation 
in social dilemmas can be stabilized by introducing reputational incentives in the form of 
partner choice. My results also suggest that people have a memory bias for information 
about uncooperative acts which is independent of the cooperativeness of the environment 
they are exposed to.  I found no relationship between the ability to identify cooperative 
intentions in faces and ToM skills.  
In summary, by unravelling the mechanisms behind reputational cooperation my 
thesis sheds light on the reasons for extensive cooperation among strangers observed in 
humans. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Inspiration and scope  
This thesis is a result of research I conducted between October 2007 and 
September 2010. When I started my PhD I was familiar with the traditional theories of 
cooperation such as kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) 
but did not know much about studies on reputation-based cooperation. I had been, 
however, already attracted to the concepts of costly signalling (Smith and Bliege Bird, 2005) 
and the handicap principle (Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997) and intrigued by phenomena which, 
at least at first sight, cannot be explained by natural selection (Darwin, 1859). Research on 
reputation building behaviour appeared to be fascinating because it related to a general 
philosophy of perceiving human behaviour through an ecological and evolutionary lens. 
Such an approach assumes that all actions serve a purpose of efficiently and successfully 
dealing with the surrounding environment.  
From my undergraduate work on displays of status, I could appreciate how much 
people can sacrifice in order to maintain high reputation. At that time, I had a chance to 
read into sociological views on human behaviour which highlight its plasticity in response 
to the presence and actions of others. The idea of building cooperative reputations ties in 
well with a broader concept of people actively directing their behaviour in front of an 
audience. In his famous sociological work, Goffman (1959) drew a parallel in which he 
compared life to a theatre and human behaviour to acting in a play in which actors take 
pains in order to dazzle the audience. Striking differences in how people behave under 
conditions of anonymity and when they are observed by others indicate that human 
behaviour is indeed shaped by perceptions of being monitored.  
What kinds of benefits can people receive when acting in a certain way in the 
presence of others? Competitive altruism theory, which is the main topic of my thesis, 
provides a plausible answer to this question: in a world where collaborators can achieve 
much more than single individuals, acquiring a trustworthy and cooperative social partner 
considerably increases profits. In order to have access to such a partner an individual needs 
to prove that he himself will make a good collaborator. When behaviour is driven by 
competition for partners individuals try to outperform each other in terms of qualities 
valued in coalitions such as cooperation, fairness and generosity. The idea of costly 
altruistic displays corresponds to the concept of conspicuous consumption formulated by 
Veblen (1899). According to him, for maintaining high social status it does not suffice to 
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merely accumulate goods, one also needs to spend them in the most ostentatious way. 
Similarly, an individual whose reputation is continuously assessed by others has to keep 
investing in it. In his book, Veblen made a loose link to conspicuous giving: 
The aid of friends and competitors is therefore brought in by resorting to the giving of valuable presents and 
expensive feasts and entertainments. (…) Costly entertainments, such as the potlatch or the ball, are 
peculiarly adapted to serve this end. The competitor with whom the entertainer wishes to institute a 
comparison is, by this method, made to serve as a means to the end. (p.47) 
  During my PhD I discovered the potential of reputations in explaining human 
cooperation. With extensive ways of monitoring others via language, people can rarely feel 
completely unobserved and free of reputational concerns, which affects how they behave. 
Obviously, kin selection and direct reciprocity still play an important role in human 
interactions, however, the willingness to trust strangers, even when high stakes are 
considered (e.g. when making online purchases), indicates the extent to which people rely 
on reputations.  The original aim of this project was to empirically test the competitive 
altruism theory (CA), an idea conceptualized by my supervisor, Dr Gilbert Roberts (1998). 
I conducted three experiments examining the mechanism of CA under various conditions. 
In the course of my PhD I became interested in the ongoing debate on whether people are 
equipped with some special cognitive mechanisms that allow them to efficiently deal with 
social partners such as the cheater detection module (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). At the 
same time, I was curious how reputational gossip is perceived and spread. I combined these 
two topics in an experiment examining memory biases in processing gossip. Another area 
that intrigued me was how people make judgements of someone‟s cooperative intentions 
when no reputational information is available. Recent reports indicate human proficiency in 
reading facial cues of cooperation and defection. However, if there was a pressure to 
evolve the ability to read cooperative intentions, another pressure should have promoted 
concealing such intentions, in particular the intention to cheat. People vary in the extent to 
which they can accurately predict others‟ trustworthiness. I investigated whether the 
variation in trustworthiness assessment might be related to the Theory of Mind (ToM) 
skills. Overall, this thesis provides new insights into how people manage their reputations 
and how concerns about reputations affect cooperation. Furthermore, it contributes to the 
knowledge about reputational gossip and discusses the link between cooperative intention 
recognition and ToM. 
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1.2. Outline and individual contributions 
The chapters in this thesis were originally prepared as research articles. The two 
studies described in Chapter 3 have been published as Sylwester and Roberts(2010). Other 
studies have been written up as manuscripts and are currently under revision or in 
preparation for submission. Most of the studies have been presented as talks or posters at 
European and international conferences on human behaviour. The chapters are sometimes 
identical or very similar to the research manuscripts submitted. For all chapters I produced 
the first draft which was then revised by Dr Gilberts Roberts who is also the co-author of 
all the papers submitted for publication. For this reason in all studies a plural „we‟ form is 
used. For some experiments (in particular Chapter 7) I also sought advice from my second 
supervisor Dr Daniel Nettle. Over the course of my PhD my work was monitored by the 
assessment panel, Dr John Lazarus and Dr Quoc Vuong, from whom I received detailed 
feedback. For the majority of the experiments I collected the data myself with the 
exception of Chapter 4 and Chapter 7.  Jonathan Sayers volunteered to assist me with 
conducting the experiment described in Chapter 4. Under my supervision, he recruited 
participants, arranged experimental sessions and implemented the program written by me 
in Z-Tree software. Jonathan also contributed to programming the questionnaire in 
Qualtrics for the study described in Chapter 7. Chapter 6 describes a study on the 
relationship between ToM and the ability to assess trustworthiness. At the EHBEA 
conference in Wroclaw (2010) I discovered that Dr Minna Lyons from Liverpool Hope 
University had investigated a similar topic using different methodology. Because of the lack 
of an effect found we decided it may be beneficial if we combine our studies and publish 
them in one paper. Chapter 7 contains only the data collected by me, as I did not 
contribute in any way to experimental design and data collection of Dr Lyons‟ study. 
Chapter 7 is a modified manuscript that we intend to submit as a multiple study with Dr 
Lyons. I was the main person working on the manuscript, however Dr Lyons contributed 
to it and I received thorough feedback from Dr Daniel Nettle.  
The original project I was appointed to work on during my PhD involved 
empirically examining CA, a theory of reputation-based cooperation. The literature review 
(Chapter 2) and the first three experiments (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) all relate to CA. Because 
they were written as separate papers there may be some overlap or repetition in terms of 
the presented background, which is however necessary in order to view the studies in the 
right context. As mentioned earlier, over the course of my PhD I became interested in 
whether people are equipped with some cognitive mechanisms that allow them to make 
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good use of reputational information and also how people assess cooperativeness using 
some proximate cues such as facial expressions when no reputation or experience is 
available. I therefore conducted two additional studies (Chapter 6 and 7) which are not 
linked to CA but do provide answers to related research questions concerning cooperation. 
The common feature of the experiments included in this thesis is that to a greater or lesser 
extent they all try to answer a question of how people assess someone‟s future 
cooperativeness. Depending on the situation, people can use information about other‟s 
pro-sociality which they observed, recall reputational gossip about them or try to predict 
their behaviour from cues of trustworthiness.   
This thesis is organised in the following way. In Chapter 2, I present a review of 
studies on reputation-based cooperation which contrasts two theories: indirect reciprocity 
(IR) and CA. A number of reviews of the traditional theories of cooperation exist in the 
literature (e.g. West et al., 2007), but there is no systematic review covering studies on 
cooperative reputations. The need for such a review arises also from the fact that IR and 
CA share some assumptions and therefore might be difficult to distinguish from each other. 
My review disentangles the two concepts and critically assesses the hitherto conducted 
research. In the next three chapters I present experiments investigating the mechanisms 
underlying reputation-based cooperation. In Chapter 3, I show how various reputational 
incentives affect cooperative behaviour and that investing in reputation translates to 
benefits in the form of access to cooperative partners and profitable interactions with them. 
In Chapter 4, I examine reputation-based cooperation in a situation where individuals vary 
in the amount of resources that they possess. I also investigate the role of the absolute and 
relative cost of reputational investments in partner choice. In Chapter 5, I compare the 
efficiency of the two mechanisms of reputation-based cooperation - CA and IR - at 
enhancing cooperation in social dilemmas. In Chapter 6 I discuss and empirically test the 
possibility of a memory bias for reputational gossip. Chapter 7 describes an investigation 
into the role of ToM in the ability to make accurate judgements about someone‟s 
cooperative intentions. Finally, in Chapter 8 I summarise my findings, consider the 
limitations of the studies and present ideas for future research. 
1.3. Methodological issues 
The studies presented in this thesis derive from different disciplines such as 
behavioural economics, social psychology, evolutionary psychology and experimental 
psychology. Experimental practices in psychology are more relaxed than those in 
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economics in at least four respects: the use of scripts, monetary incentives, repetition and 
deception (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001).  
 Economists commonly use scripts (detailed instructions) in which they clearly 
specify participants‟ roles in the game, their possible decisions and payoffs associated with 
different decisions. Psychologists, on the other hand, usually provide very general 
information about the study and allow participants to conjecture the context of the 
experiment. Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) assert that scripts increase replicability whereas 
the lack of them may lead to a change in participants‟ behaviour. Participants might be 
trying to guess the context of a task or perform in order to satisfy experimenter‟s 
expectations. While I agree that using scripts can reduce any noise resulting from different 
interpretations of the study, it is worth pointing out that some psychological experiments 
aim to measure participants‟ spontaneous judgements not embedded in any context (e.g. 
studies on attractiveness). Moreover, in real life people often act under conditions of 
uncertainty or in an unpredictable environment, hence measuring people‟s behaviour in 
vaguely determined contexts may faithfully reflect how people make real-life decisions. 
Also, researchers providing participants with as little information as possible avoid the 
problem of the framing effect. Different wordings used in the instruction can induce 
cooperation or competition and in consequence affect participants‟ behaviour (van Vugt, 
2001). In this thesis, for the three experiments involving playing economic games with 
others (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), I adopted the rigorous economic conventions. Participants 
were provided with scripts and knew exactly in what way their payoffs would be affected 
by their decisions. For the studies described in Chapters 6 and 7 I used a traditional 
psychological methodology and provided participants with general instructions which made 
no reference to their role and context of the tasks. 
Second, economic and psychological studies differ with regard to using repeated 
trials versus snapshot studies (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). Economists posit that 
participants may behave differently when exposed to a novel task for the first time than 
after habituating to it e.g. a common finding is that participants‟ contributions to a public 
pool decrease over time in iterated games (e.g. Isaac et al., 1994).  In my opinion, choosing 
the right method depends on what a researcher aims to measure. In order to capture 
optimal behaviour repeated trials affected by learning should be examined whereas when 
spontaneous and intuitive behaviour is of interest snapshot studies would be appropriate. 
Henrich (2001) convincingly argues that in real life people often make one-shot decisions, 
hence experiments reflecting such decisions are justified. Henrich‟s et al. (2004) seminal 
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cross-cultural work on human pro-sociality relied mostly on one-shot trials of the 
Ultimatum game because the researchers intended to capture natural, non-learned 
behaviour of inexperienced individuals. In this thesis, in the three experiments employing 
behavioural economics procedures (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) rounds were repeated and 
different conditions were presented in a balanced order. The possible memory effects 
resulting from such repetition are discussed in the greatest detail in Chapter 5. 
The third difference between economic and psychological approaches to 
methodology is the use of financial incentives (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). Experimental 
economists typically use monetary incentives paid according to participants‟ performance 
(Camerer, 2003) while psychologists tend to provide participants with hypothetical rather 
than actual choices (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). There is mixed evidence with regard to 
how monetary incentives affect performance (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). One of the 
debated problems is the occurrence of a hypothetical bias (also referred to as „cheap talk‟) – 
being more willing to declare to pay in a survey than when having an option of an actual 
payment. When considering contributions in a public goods game used frequently in 
research on human cooperation no strong evidence of a hypothetical bias exists. In a study 
by Champ and Bishop (2001) participants were asked whether they would be willing to 
purchase a public good, wind-generated electricity that would benefit the whole community. 
Half of participants were asked a hypothetical question whereas the other half had to 
actually pay the agreed amount if they decided for the purchase. Approximately a half 
fewer participants decided to invest in the public good when it involved actual expenses in 
comparison to when it was hypothetical. In contrast, a recent study involving participants 
playing a public goods game with heterogeneous resources did not show any evidence of 
such a hypothetical bias (Mitani and Flores, 2009). In the three experiments described in 
this thesis which employed the public good game, in most cases, participants received 
monetary payment in proportion to their experimental earnings (but see the detailed 
descriptions in methods of each chapter).  Two anonymous reviewers who read two 
different manuscripts included in this thesis complained that the amounts given to 
participants were relatively low to induce „true‟ economic behaviour (one of the reviewers 
was concerned that we did not examine the behaviour of Homo economicus but Homo ludens). 
Such an allegation does not appear to be valid. First, undergraduate students usually rely on 
their parents‟ financial support or undertake various part-time jobs; hence the amounts 
gained in an experiment are likely to have a higher value to them than to academic staff. 
Also, although average earnings reached £6 - £7, the maximum possible payoff was much 
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greater. Therefore, although not very probable it was possible to earn substantial amounts 
of money, depending on others‟ behaviour (i.e. if the target individual was selfish and all 
others cooperated in each round). Second, economic experiments conducted in developing 
countries in which the experimental stakes were even equal to a monthly salary produced 
similar results to those with relatively low stakes (Camerer, 2003). 
Finally, another methodological issue that differentiates psychologists from 
economists according to Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) is the use of deception. Deceiving 
participants can be questioned on internal and external grounds. Ethically speaking, 
deception may cause some discomfort, resentment and the impression of being „fooled‟ in 
participants, as arrestingly illustrated by Milgram‟s (1963) famous study on obedience. 
However, a review of studies using deception did not allow for an unanimous conclusion 
of how participants‟ mood is affected (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2008). An external reason 
for not adopting deception is the possibility that it will increase participants‟ suspicion and 
distrustfulness which will affect the results of future studies (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). 
I recruited participants separately for each experiment presented in this thesis. For the 
experiments described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I ensured that participants were naïve i.e. 
took part only in one of the described experiments. Because Chapters 6 and 7 were 
conceptually and methodologically different from earlier chapters focusing on CA, some 
participants who did one of the first four experiments (two experiments from Chapter 3, 
one experiment in Chapter 4 and one in chapter 5) were able to take part in experiments in 
Chapters 6 and 7. In defence of deception it can be argued that, besides being often the 
least expensive method, without it, some important findings would not have been brought 
to light (see van Vugt, 2001). Following the APA recommendations I used experimental 
manipulation in a cost-effective way; that is, only in cases when it was absolutely necessary 
in order to induce conditions which are difficult to observe naturally (see Chapter 4). 
Participants were thoroughly debriefed after the experiment and did not express any 
complaints when the nature of the experiments was revealed to them. All presented 
experiments received ethics approvals from the Newcastle University Psychology Ethics 
Committee. 
Recently, it has been pointed out that the majority of findings in behavioural 
science are obtained from a very non-representative group of Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) participants (Henrich et al., 2010). WEIRD 
participants can behave strikingly different from groups less well represented in studies (e.g. 
with small-scale societies) in domains including visual perception, spatial reasoning, sense 
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of fairness and cooperation. The evidence presented by Henrich et al. (2010) is compelling 
but I believe studies using students allow one to make a first step when investigating a 
novel problem. As suggested by Gächter (2010), student participant pools make an 
excellent benchmark when examining important research questions in behavioural 
economics. Although the results presented in this thesis are based on data mostly from 
students and therefore cannot be generalized, they provide a useful first test of the 
proposed hypotheses.   
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2. From indirect reciprocity to competitive altruism: a 
review of  studies on reputation-based cooperation 
2.1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades researchers have been accumulating evidence for a new 
explanation of the evolutionary puzzle of human cooperation – reputation building. The 
dawn of the investigation into reputation-based cooperation came with the publication of 
Richard Alexander‟s “The Biology of Moral Systems” (1987).  Alexander‟s role in adding 
reputation building to an array of evolutionary explanations of cooperation relied on the 
fact that he analysed the possible costs and benefits of high and low reputations and 
discussed long-term consequences of both. The notion of a cooperative reputation refers 
to a characteristic of an individual which describes their willingness to cooperate. This 
characteristic is constructed by an exchange of information about an individual‟s past 
behaviour. Technically, a cooperative reputation consists of a history of cooperative and 
uncooperative acts towards other individuals. In practice, reputations are used to make 
predictions about the probability of future cooperative behaviour. Acquiring a high 
cooperative reputation is costly: an individual needs to invest in unreciprocated help 
towards others. What are the benefits of a high cooperative reputation? Two evolutionary 
theories discussed in this review, indirect reciprocity (IR) and competitive altruism (CA), 
propose different mechanisms to answer this question. The lack of cross-referencing does 
not allow the two theories to be put into perspective and necessitates a critical assessment 
summarising the contributions of IR and CA to understanding the role of reputations in 
cooperation. 
2.2. The uniqueness of human reputation-based cooperation 
In „The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex‟ Darwin (1871) stated: “I 
fully subscribe to the judgement of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the 
lower animals the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important” (p.67). Although morality 
strictly refers to “a code of conduct put forward by a society or (…) rational persons” (Gert, 2008) it 
can more simply be viewed as a display of other-regarding preferences. Darwin (1871) 
clearly thought that morality contributes to human uniqueness in the animal kingdom but 
he also asserted that “the difference in mind between man and the higher animals (…) is certainly one of 
degree and not of kind” (p.101). Indeed, the idea that other-regarding preferences are confined 
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to humans has been challenged by numerous studies highlighting various forms of empathy 
in animals (for a review see: de Waal, 2003). The presence of pro-social preferences in 
animals undermines the notion of the distinctiveness of human moral behaviour and 
encourages seeking the roots of morality in biology rather than culture. On the other hand, 
a study by Silk et al. (2005) highlighted chimpanzees‟ selfishness and the lack of concerns 
for others even when help is not costly. 
Although cooperation appears to be difficult to reconcile with natural selection 
theory, some examples of cooperative behaviour have now clear evolutionary explanations. 
Undisputedly, kin selection theory or inclusive fitness: helping those who share the same 
genes, unravels the mechanism behind cooperation between related individuals e.g. 
consensual slavery in social insects or nepotism in humans (Hamilton, 1964). Similarly, 
reciprocal altruism or direct reciprocity, that is, exchanging cooperative acts between two 
individuals accounts for numerous examples of cooperation such as food sharing or 
warning calls (Trivers, 1971). However, there are limitations to the application of these 
theories: according to kin selection, a cooperative act should occur only when the cost to 
the benefactor is smaller than the benefit to the receiver multiplied by the coefficient of 
relatedness, whereas in reciprocal altruism the benefit to the receiver must exceed the cost 
of performing the act and the two individuals need to re-meet. Helping kin or reciprocating 
help can surely be called moral in contrast to not doing so but human morality extends 
beyond cooperation with immediate benefits. Kin selection and reciprocal altruism explain 
many non-human acts of cooperation or other-regarding preferences but do not allow for 
interpreting the „stranger-regarding‟ behaviour which entails helping unrelated individuals 
who will not have a chance to reciprocate (Palameta and Brown, 1999). 
 The biological approach to cooperation and altruism relies on finding ways in 
which helpful individuals can profit from the help that they provide. Hence, the term 
„altruism‟, “helping … purely out of the desire to benefit someone else, with no benefit (and often a cost) to 
oneself” (Aronson et al., 2004, p.382), may not be the most appropriate one to use when 
discussing evolutionarily based cooperation. Psychological altruism clearly exists in 
humans: people do not meticulously calculate whether an altruistic act will pay off or not, 
and their pro-social actions are proximately motivated by the feeling of „warm glow‟ which 
results from the activation of reward circuits in the brain (Rilling et al., 2002). When 
considering biological altruism, however, an individual‟s fitness is treated as a reference 
point, hence a truly altruistic act would require that cooperation decreases the fitness of the 
benefactor and increases the fitness of the recipient (Wilson, 1975). Although psychological 
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motivations for helping may not be dictated by future rewards, if the benefactor is 
rewarded and the cost of a cooperative act is recouped, the act cannot be called altruistic in 
the biological sense. For this reason, the names of biological theories which explain 
cooperation through payoffs to the benefactor such as „reciprocal altruism‟ or „competitive 
altruism‟ can be misleading and the use of the term „cooperation‟ or „aid‟ rather than 
„altruism‟ would be more appropriate. At the same time, as noticed by de Waal (2008), 
cooperation can be truly other-oriented in the sense that it yields rewards via others. 
When describing reciprocal altruism Trivers (1971) mentioned multiparty 
interactions relying on information exchange such as detecting cheaters and passing on 
their reputations. A clear theoretical framework of reputation-based cooperation was 
presented by Alexander (1987) who suggested that IR may be unique to humans; however, 
he did not exclude the possibility that animals may possess some rudimentary form of it. 
Indeed, a few reports indicate that animals use reputations when making decisions who to 
choose as a partner. Cleaner fish and reef fish form mutually beneficial relationships in 
which the cleaner fish feed by removing parasites and dead tissue from the reef fish 
(Bshary, 2002). Cleaners can exploit clients by feeding on their healthy instead of 
parasitized tissue which results in the clients jolting. Bshary (2002) observed that clients pay 
attention to the interactions between cleaner fish and other reef fish and make a decision 
who to invite as a cleaner based on cleaners‟ reputations. Later it was experimentally shown 
that cleaners observed to be cooperative were preferred by clients and that a cleaner‟s 
cooperation towards the current client increased when they were watched by other clients 
(Bshary and Grutter, 2006). The existence of reputation-based choices of partners has also 
been tested in great apes. Among gorillas, orang-utans, bonobos and chimpanzees only the 
last species was shown to spend significantly more time with and beg for food from a 
person observed to be cooperative than with a selfish person (Russell et al., 2008, Subiaul 
et al., 2008). The presented evidence from animals is scarce and does not directly address 
the concept of IR according to which individuals of high cooperative reputation would be 
more likely to receive help from others, or CA which posits that individuals try to 
outcompete each other with cooperative reputations in order to secure access to desired 
partners. On the contrary, the fish and ape studies mentioned above demonstrate that 
individuals of high reputation are more likely to be asked for help again. Hence, the current 
evidence does not allow for extending the theories of IR and CA to animals.  
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2.3. Indirect reciprocity and its different meanings 
Give, and it shall be given unto you… For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured 
to you again.  Luke 6:38 
The idea that good deeds will be rewarded by a third party is not new. Abrahamic 
religions use this notion in order to encourage followers to cooperate: good deeds are 
believed to be reciprocated by the supernatural force in the afterlife. It was not until 1987, 
however, that Richard Alexander noticed that cooperation can be rewarded hic et nunc by 
someone other than the beneficiary. Interestingly, Alexander (1987) posited that the driving 
force for moral systems based on IR is between-group competition. Such an approach has 
probably been derived from Darwin (1871) who noted: 
 There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who (…) were always ready to give aid to 
each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; 
and this would be natural selection. (p.159)  
Higher cooperation among in-group than out-group members is well documented 
in humans and occurs even when groups are created by using such an insignificant criterion 
as the preference of one painter over another one (Tajfel, 1970, Tajfel et al., 1971). 
Recently Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) showed that reputation-based cooperation is 
sensitive to the observer‟s group membership. In their study, in-group favourism 
disappeared when the recipient of the cooperative act was oblivious of the group 
membership of the benefactor. Only when the donor‟s membership was public did he 
invest in in-group reputation by giving more to in-group rather than out-group members. 
Similarly, when recipients of cooperation did not know the group identity of the donor, 
donors exhibited an in-group bias only when exposed to an image of eyes, a cue of being 
watched (Mifune et al., 2010). Such results indicate that individuals adjust their 
cooperativeness according to whether the observers belong to their group or not because 
higher in-group favourism is likely to pay off through IR within one‟s own social group.  
Alexander (1987) described IR as cooperative behaviour where “the return is expected 
from someone other than the recipient of the beneficence” (p.85). Earlier in his book he provided two 
examples of IR: either “A helps B, B helps C, C helps A” or “A helps B; C, observing, later helps 
A; A helps C” (p.81). Reputation matters only in the latter example where individuals‟ 
behaviour is monitored and the decision to help is inspired by the high cooperative 
reputation of the recipient. It is worth noting that Alexander actually suggests that IR leads 
to direct reciprocity: after the initial assessment individuals C and A exchange help.  In the 
former example cooperation is motivated by the mere fact of receiving help and is directed 
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to an individual of an unknown reputation. 
 
The two examples presented by Alexander have been dubbed upstream and 
downstream IR where upstream reciprocity refers to a unidirectional stream of cooperation 
whereas downstream reciprocity occurs when cooperation is initiated by acquiring positive 
reputational information about others (see Figure 2.1). Simulations of the evolution of 
downstream and upstream strategies demonstrated that with increasing group size, it 
becomes particularly difficult for upstream IR to dominate (Boyd and Richerson, 1989). 
Although downstream IR requires that individuals know how others behaved (rather than 
what happened to them), such a strategy can evolve under a wider range of conditions than 
downstream reciprocity. Upstream reciprocity has been referred to as „generalized 
reciprocity‟ which clearly separates it from the reputation-based IR (Pfeiffer et al., 2005). 
The reason for the occurrence of generalized reciprocity is difficult to explain: why, after 
receiving help from a stranger, would an individual feel an „urge‟ to help someone else? 
Nowak and Roch (2007) assert that generalized reciprocity is a by-product of direct 
reciprocity, a misdirected act of gratitude. A mechanism of generalized reciprocity does not 
require complex cognitive skills; individuals simply follow a rule: help if you have been 
helped. It has been shown that generalized reciprocity can induce and maintain cooperation 
in small groups (Pfeiffer et al., 2005), however later it was found that in order for 
cooperation to evolve, generalized reciprocity has to be linked to another mechanism 
(Nowak and Roch, 2007). Generalized reciprocity, unlike downstream IR, due to its 
simplicity, is a more plausible mechanism to be found in animals. Rutte and Taborsky 
(2007) demonstrated that rats were willing to help unknown individuals if they had been 
helped before. This review focuses on cooperation invoked by reputational concerns and 
not direct experience hence the term „indirect reciprocity‟ (IR) is reserved to refer to 
downstream indirect reciprocity.  
A B
C
First A helps B
Then B helps C
A B
C
First A helps B
Then C helps A
UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM  
Figure 2.1 Upstream (based on positive experience) and downstream (based on reputation) indirect 
reciprocity (adapted from Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). 
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IR can be viewed from the perspective of punishment and reward. Individuals of 
low cooperative reputation are punished by being denied help or altruistically (at one‟s own 
cost) rewarded by being given help (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, Rand et al., 2009). It has 
been proposed that rewarding in IR is, at least partly, truly altruistic in the sense that it 
occurs even if it does not entail reputational benefits (Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009). 
Cooperation in IR can have various motives: an individual can help either to reward 
someone of a high cooperative reputation or in order to increase his own reputation. 
Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) disentangled them by making participants‟ reputations 
private or public. When donors‟ reputation was public the helping rate increased in 
comparison to when it was private, but even in the private condition cooperation reached a 
relatively high level (22%-49% - private helping rate, 66%-86% - public helping rate). The 
researchers interpreted this as evidence for „pure‟ or altruistic IR, not contaminated by 
reputational concerns and motivated by the pure willingness to punish non-cooperators by 
not helping them and reward cooperators by providing them costly help. However, another 
result slightly undermines such a conclusion: participants were willing to help people of 
unknown reputations at a similar rate to those with known reputations in both public and 
private conditions. In that case, rewarding cooperation or punishing the lack of it cannot 
explain cooperative behaviour and it appears that a more general rule is used (e.g. upstream 
reciprocity or donors optimistically assumed that although unknown, the recipient‟s 
reputation is high). The concept of pure IR contradicts the original definition of Alexander 
(1987) according to whom individuals‟ reputations are “continually being assessed and reassessed 
by interactants (…) on the basis of their interactions with others” (p.85). Alexander pointed out the 
possible benefits coming from IR which are: (1) profitable direct interactions with others 
who observed a cooperative act (which corresponds to CA), (2) direct compensation from 
all or part of the group such as the increase of status or (3) sharing the success of the group 
within which the cooperator acted which contributes to the cooperator‟s own descendants. 
In pure IR donor‟s reputation can neither be assessed nor rewarded by others. 
2.4. Conceptual extensions of indirect reciprocity 
Before Alexander published his theory of IR, a similar concept appeared in the 
work of Sugden (1986). Sugden described a game in which individuals use someone‟s 
„standing‟ in order to decide whether to cooperate with them or not. Good standing is 
achieved by cooperating with individuals of good standing and reputation does not 
decrease when help is refused to those of bad standing. Hence standing is a way of 
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measuring cooperative reputation in which indirect tit-for-tat is rewarded. Another method 
of assigning reputations is „image scoring‟ where a positive reputation is given to an 
individual who cooperated in the past while reputation decreases if help is denied even to 
individuals of low reputational score (see Figure 2.2). 
 
help
help
no help
A
B
C
+
+
-
IMAGE SCORING & STANDING
no help A
B
C
-
-
no help
no help
IMAGE SCORING 
STANDING
no change in 
reputation
 
„+‟ increase in reputation, „-‟ decrease in reputation 
Figure 2.2 Reputational consequences of helping and refusing to help individuals of different 
reputations under image scoring and standing.  
 
Pollock and Dugatkin (1992) compared a strategy of directly reciprocal tit-for-tat 
(TFT) with Observer TFT, which corresponds to image scoring where the image is based 
solely on the last move, and found that when the duration of cooperative encounters was 
uncertain reputation-based cooperation was more likely to emerge than when the 
probability of future interactions was high. In another model of image scoring individuals 
had different thresholds of donating help: they would only help those whose image score 
was equal or higher than their threshold (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). Simulations revealed 
the dominant strategy in which individuals helped everyone with a score of at least 0. 
However, when mutations were added, in the long run, image scoring was vulnerable to the 
invasion of unconditional cooperators and these in turn were likely to be invaded by 
unconditional defectors. It was also shown that in order for image scoring to be 
evolutionarily stable, the benefit to the recipient multiplied by the probability of knowing 
the recipient‟s reputation needs to exceed the cost of the cooperative act (Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1998).  
The mechanism of image scoring does not appear to be realistic because it does not 
account for justified defections (not helping a non-cooperator). If, as suggested by Fehr 
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and Fischbacher (2003), IR relies on punishing and rewarding individuals of different 
reputations, punishing a non-cooperator by not helping him should be perceived as fair. 
The standing strategy avoids this problem and good standers were shown to invade a 
population of image scorers (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001). Moreover, when the image 
scoring model was re-analyzed with the introduction of errors, defectors soon became the 
most successful group; standing proved to be much more resistant to the invasion of 
defectors (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003). Although standing appears to be a perfect 
candidate for a mechanism people use to assign reputations, an empirical study undermined 
its applicability. Milinski and colleagues (2001) experimentally distinguished between image 
scoring and standing and found that participants‟ behaviour was more compatible with the 
former. The researchers speculated that, although standing is superior to image scoring in 
theoretical models, in real life people might not have the cognitive capacity to process such 
complex assessments. Ideally, under the standing strategy, upon seeing defection, an 
individual needs to know whether the recipient was seen defecting, but also, assuming the 
recipient defected in the past, whether the defection was directed to an individual seen 
defecting and whether that individual defected because of someone else‟s defection, etc.  
The question of what norms describe whether someone is perceived as good or bad 
was addressed in three theoretical papers (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004, Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 
2006, Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2007). An examination of all possible ways in which reputation 
can be assigned revealed that there are eight strategies („leading eight‟) which, when in use, 
can maintain the evolutionary stability of IR (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). The common 
features of the leading eight heavily rely on actions towards a good person: helping a good 
person is always good and not helping a good person is bad. Moreover, not helping a bad 
person is good. Among the leading eight are standing and „judging‟ – a strategy similar to 
standing in which helping a bad person is considered as bad. All of the leading strategies 
discriminate between justified and unjustified defection. Despite the theoretical advantage 
of standing-like strategies, the problem still remains how people assess reputations in reality. 
The troublesome gap between theoretical models and Milinski et al.‟s (2001) study has not 
yet been explained but a number of studies showed that humans take into account second-
order behaviour of others when rewarding or punishing them. Although punishing a non-
cooperator at one‟s own cost benefits the group, people are not willing to impose second-
order punishment of non-punishers or second-order reward of punishers (actually, they are 
likely to punish the punishers, see  Herrmann et al., 2008). People do, however, support 
rewarders of cooperators and punish non-rewarders, which suggests that they willingly 
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react to positive sanctions (Kiyonari and Barclay, 2008). On the other hand, it has been 
reported that people who engage in altruistic punishment are desired as interaction partners 
and are entrusted more money than non-punishers (Nelissen, 2008). If cheating or not 
cooperating is viewed as a form of punishment then humans, in contrast to the 
assumptions of image scoring, do seem to consider the context of others‟ non -cooperation. 
Moreover, people treat punishers who incurred various costs of punishment differently 
which suggests a complex reputation assessment technique (Nelissen, 2008). Finally, when 
discussing which of the two models image scoring or standing is more realistic, it is worth 
considering how strict the assumptions of IR models are. In modelling IR individuals 
cannot re-meet, whereas no one can prevent individuals from interacting again in a natural 
environment. This artificial feature of modelling IR has been addressed by Roberts (2008) 
who showed that when re-meeting is possible standing outperforms image scoring. 
In a standard IR model, acts of cooperation increase reputation whereas not giving 
to another person when there is a chance to do so, decreases it. More specifically, in image 
scoring giving results in +1 score and non-giving in -1. Image scoring, then, assumes 
opposite but equal values of good and bad deeds. It has been theoretically shown that the 
value of an act depends on the benefits of cooperation (Rankin and Eggimann, 2009). High 
benefits of cooperation favour the evolution of a judgement bias in which cooperation has 
more value than non-cooperation whereas with small benefits of cooperation judgement 
bias is shifted towards non-cooperation. Rankin and Eggimann (2009) point to the studies 
that suggest judgement bias in humans by reporting that cheaters are remembered better 
than cooperators (e.g. Vanneste et al., 2007). Judgement bias has also been noticed in the 
area of book reputations: negative reviews affected the selling rates much more than 
positive reviews (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). Given the weak theoretical underpinnings 
of image scoring, in this thesis, I will be referring to IR as a function the standing strategy. 
2.5. Empirical evidence for indirect reciprocity 
In recent years an abundance of studies supported the basic premise of IR and CA, 
namely that caring about reputations affects human behaviour. Reputations can be formed 
whenever an individual is observed by others, hence, according to reputation-based 
cooperation theories, in such a context individuals should be more cooperative than when 
alone. Indeed, even under conditions of anonymity, cues of being watched make people 
more cooperative. Presenting participants with eyespots on the computer screen increased 
their generosity (Haley and Fessler, 2005) and displaying an image of eyes next to an 
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honesty box instead of a neutral image resulted in higher contributions (Bateson et al., 
2006). Similarly, people exhibited higher levels of cooperation when they were “watched” 
by an image of a robot (Burnham and Hare, 2007). However, in a carefully controlled 
experiment, cooperative behaviour of participants working in complete anonymity in a 
private context did not differ from when participants were anonymous but worked in the 
same room with others (Lamba and Mace, 2010). This finding suggests that people can 
recognize when they are really anonymous even if they are surrounded by others (public 
context) and act strategically i.e. display lower levels of cooperation than when their 
behaviour is revealed. The differences between the aforementioned studies might have 
been due to the economic game used. In the Ultimatum game employed by Lamba and 
Mace (2010) sharing resources with another person does not reflect true altruism because 
the recipient can punish the proposer if the split is unfair. Hence, under both private and 
public conditions it is in the proposer‟s interest to offer a split fair enough to be accepted 
by the recipient. Supportive of such an explanation are the results obtained by Charness 
and Gneezy (2008) who showed that revealing someone‟s family name increased their 
generosity in the Dictator game (where the recipient is completely passive with respect to 
how the money is shared) but not in the Ultimatum game. 
Human cooperative behaviour is affected even when reputation gained lasts for a 
very short time. When reputations can be transferred from one economic game to another 
one, contributions to the public pool increase (Semmann et al., 2004). For enhancing 
cooperation it is important that identification information (e.g. a photograph) is made 
public together with the cooperative decision: neither displaying photographs alone nor 
cooperative decisions changes participants‟ behaviour (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). When 
given a choice people prefer to reveal their donations rather than keep them anonymous 
and the possibility of choice between the two options increases the overall generosity 
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). By avoiding confidentiality individuals ensure that they are not 
perceived as selfish which might occur if they donated anonymously. Also, in a real-life 
setting participants were more willing to provide assistance to strangers when their pro-
social offers were made in the presence of their peers than when they were anonymous 
(Bereczkei et al., 2007). 
A broad assumption of IR is that people are concerned about their cooperative 
reputations when observed by others, but in particular when others have a chance to 
indirectly reciprocate their cooperation. Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) reported that 
in their sample only 20% of participants were categorized as non-strategic i.e. helped other 
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individuals even though it did not affect their reputation whereas the behaviour of over 
50% was classified as strongly strategic i.e. they increased their helping rate at least twice 
when that could be reflected in their reputational score in comparison to when their 
reputational score was not made public. This result ties in with the notion of different 
cooperative types in humans. In a sample investigated by Kurzban and Houser (2005), 
reciprocators (i.e. those who reacted to others‟ behaviour) made up 63% of players whereas 
unconditional cooperators and free-riders constituted a much smaller proportion of 
participants. Strategic vs. non-strategic IR was investigated in a study on heterogeneous 
social preferences (Simpson and Willer, 2008). Using an ecologically valid measure of pro-
social preferences, the Social Value Orientation Scale, the researchers divided participants a 
priori into egoists and altruists.  It was demonstrated that only egoists were affected by the 
reputational incentives in IR; altruists were willing to split their allocation in a similar way 
irrespective of whether their decision would be revealed to another splitter or not. 
Moreover, egoists were also more sensitive to the context in which their partners split the 
money previously and gave more to those whose reputation was built in a private rather 
than public condition. Hence, they regarded helping done without realising that others 
would observe it as more reward-deserving than helping in the context of reputational 
incentives. 
Another intrinsic feature of IR is that cooperators reap benefits from cooperation 
in the form of indirectly reciprocated acts of kindness. Indeed, in an experimental setting, 
participants of high image score received money more frequently than those with lower 
image score from others who observed their generosity (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000). In 
another experiment, it was noted that 48% of donors considered the recipient‟s reputation 
when making a decision about their donation and tended to help those with high 
reputational score (Seinen and Schram, 2006). At the same time 35% of donors made their 
cooperative decision taking into account their own cooperative score (the lower the score 
the more likely they were to provide help). The high percent of donors basing their 
cooperative decisions on the reputational status of the recipient resulted in the individuals‟ 
concern over their own reputation.  
Giving to a charity has also been shown to yield cooperative rewards (Milinski et al., 
2002a). Participants who decided to donate more money to UNICEF received more from 
others in the subsequent rounds. Moreover, the sum of the donations to UNICEF and 
other players was positively associated with votes in the election for the students‟ council. 
In another study, high cooperative reputation translated to higher payoffs in directly 
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reciprocal interactions (Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002). Further evidence for benefits 
that can be gained from reputation comes from a controlled field experiment on EBay. An 
EBayer with an established reputation received a significantly higher price for his items 
than a new seller (Resnick et al., 2006). In this example however, IR is probably not the 
only mechanism affecting people‟s behaviour. EBayers entrust their money to sellers 
expecting in exchange high-quality goods. Hence such an interaction can be viewed as 
directly reciprocal.  
Theoretical models showed that systems of IR can be stable under certain 
conditions (e.g. Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). The question remained, however, whether in 
reality cooperation would be maintained when individuals have a chance to cooperate with 
others of known reputations. Cooperation in social dilemmas i.e. situations when one can 
either perform an action that benefits oneself or an action that benefits others has been 
extensively investigated in experimental economics. The unanimous finding is that, under 
conditions of full anonymity, although individuals show some level of pro-sociality at the 
beginning of the game, with repeated rounds, cooperation drops dramatically and the game 
finishes with a majority of selfish actors (e.g. Isaac et al., 1994). Such a result can be viewed 
as a “tragedy of the commons”: if individuals have free access to a public resource, they 
start to selfishly overexploit it and the resource is quickly depleted (Hardin, 1968). 
Punishment was demonstrated to be an effective way in which cooperation in social 
dilemmas is sustained (Fehr and Gächter, 2002); however, recent reports on antisocial 
punishment question its role in enhancing cooperation (Herrmann et al., 2008). Milinski 
and colleagues (2002b) addressed a question of whether the IR context could also prevent 
individuals from becoming selfish. In their experiment, social dilemma rounds were 
alternated with rounds in which individuals could transfer money to a third-party without 
the possibility of direct reciprocation. The level of cooperation remained stable over 
rounds. In another condition, participants first played a number of social dilemma rounds, 
after which IR rounds were introduced and played subsequently. After the initial decrease 
in cooperation during rounds without reputational incentives, cooperation recovered and 
reached a high level. Moreover, when the payoffs of groups with IR-alternated and non-
alternated social dilemma rounds were compared, groups with IR earned significantly more 
money. In summary, it was shown that IR, like altruistic punishment, works well at 
maintaining high levels of cooperation. Considering that many real-life situations resemble 
social dilemmas and that people make use of reputations, such a design accurately reflected 
a possible mechanism behind the stability of human cooperation (Milinski et al., 2002b).   
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2.6. Theories behind reputation-based partner choice  
As presented above, IR potentially accounts for instances of cooperation which 
could not be explained by traditional theories such as kin selection and reciprocal altruism. 
However, a problem remains how to treat unconditional cooperation such as donations to 
a third party not based on their reputational score, which frequently occur in human 
societies (e.g. giving to charity or donating blood). Inspiration derived from theories of 
costly signalling and biological markets resulted in a concept of another mechanism of 
human cooperation which applies to unconditional helping – competitive altruism (Roberts, 
1998).  
The core assumption of CA is that a cooperative act functions not only as a mere 
action in response to another individual‟s cooperation but as a signal informing about some 
underlying qualities of the signaller. Such an interpretation stems from comparing 
cooperation to costly displays in the handicap principle (Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997). An 
individual‟s behaviour can serve as an honest signal of quality to others if it fulfils certain 
criteria (Smith and Bliege Bird, 2005). First, the signal needs to be (at least temporarily) 
costly to the sender, a condition which is by definition satisfied by a cooperative act. In 
order for the signal to be reliable, the relative cost of it has to vary between individuals of 
different classes i.e. it should be less affordable to individuals of low status. The signal 
needs also to be broadcasted to the audience so it should not be performed in anonymous 
conditions. Finally, both the sender and the receiver of the signal need to reap benefits. In 
a typical handicap, e.g. a peacock‟s tail, the receiver of the signal benefits only by acquiring 
ecologically important information about the sender. With cooperation, if the receiver of a 
signal is also the receiver of a cooperative act, the benefit increases considerably. Signal 
senders, on the other hand, benefit by acquiring access to valuable social and mating 
partners. As cooperation meets all the above requirements (see Table 2.1) it is tempting to 
view it in the context of costly signalling. Zahavi (1995) did notice the potential in the 
handicap principle to extend to cooperation; however, he did not develop the theory fully. 
It is worth noting that Zahavian handicap principle is just one way through which a signal 
can be reliable e.g. according to Brown and Moore‟s (2002) classification, expression of 
pro-social emotions would be a physiologically constrained honest index of cooperation 
because it involves facial movements which are not under the voluntary control.  
Costly signalling via cooperation can occur if individuals vary in quality and when 
quality can be reflected in behaviour.  Gintis et al. (2001) developed a multi-player game in 
which they examined whether costly signalling can increase in a population when it is 
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initially rare. The researchers found that costly signalling of quality in the form of 
contributions to the public pool can be evolutionarily stable if the signalled qualities are 
beneficial to potential social and mating partners. Lotem et al. (2002) investigated how 
individual variation in quality and the introduction of signalling benefits affect cooperation. 
The main assumption of their model is a positive association between altruism and quality, 
so high-quality individuals provide extensive help whereas low-quality individuals tend to 
defect. It was shown that, when quality is signalled, unconditional altruism by high-quality 
individuals can emerge and stabilize the system in which low-quality individuals either 
defect or reciprocate (Lotem et al., 2002).  
Table 2.1 Examples of human and animal cooperation functioning as a handicap. 
Anthropological literature gives accounts of pro-social behaviours likely to function 
as costly signals. Skilled men from the Meriam tribe in Melanesia engage in dangerous turtle 
hunting for reasons clearly different from acquiring food for themselves (Bliege Bird et al., 
2001). Hunters widely distribute the meat among group members during a feast. The 
majority of attendees know the identity of the successful hunters and such recognition 
results in social and reproductive benefits (Smith et al., 2003a).  Another example comes 
from indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest Coast who organize potlatches, feasts 
during which they make gifts to members of nearby villages in order to outperform them in 
generosity (Jonaitis, 1991). It is still under debate whether pro-sociality really translates to 
some underlying qualities or „good genes‟. Experimental research linked altruism to 
intelligence, a highly desirable quality in both social and mating partners (Millet and 
Dewitte, 2007). The IQ of participants classified as altruists was significantly higher than 
those classified as mere cooperators (giving a fair share) or egoists. Brown et al. (2005) 
Requirement Animal example (allopreening) Human example (charity giving) 
 
costly 
 
expenditure of time and energy 
 
expenditure of resources 
reliable 
more expensive to low-quality individuals 
who sometimes cannot afford it 
more expensive to low-resource individuals 
who sometimes cannot afford it 
observable 
publicly available to observe either publicly announced by the charity or 
advertised in the form of a charity badge 
benefits the sender 
reputation of a high-quality individual 
resulting in better access to mates and 
coalitions 
reputation of a high-quality individual 
resulting in better access to mates and 
coalitions 
benefits the receiver 
removal of parasites and maintenance of 
plumage condition, information about the 
quality of potential coalition partners 
improving the welfare of the group in need, 
information about the resources and pro-
sociality of the signaller 
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found a link between altruism and health in older adults; however, the causality of this 
relationship could not be determined. More research is needed to explore the question 
whether pro-social behaviour signals characteristics other than wealth and cooperative 
intentions. 
Apart from costly signalling, another cornerstone of CA is competition for partners, 
which also plays a crucial role in the biological market theory (BM). Although when first 
describing CA Roberts (1998) did not identify the link between the two concepts, other 
researchers noticed and pointed it out later (Chiang, 2010, Barclay, 2010). According to BM 
forces of supply and demand observable in economic markets apply equally well to animal 
and human ecology (Noë and Hammerstein, 1994, Noë and Hammerstein, 1995). 
Whenever an asymmetry in the possession of certain commodities exists in a population, 
individuals benefit from the exchange of different types of commodities. The rules of 
supply and demand determine the value of the commodities and the value of individuals 
possessing different commodities as social partners. Partner choice and competition for the 
most desirable partners constitute an essential ingredient of BM. A common feature of 
costly signalling and BM is that individuals can advertise their commodities or qualities as 
exchange partners, but unlike costly signalling, BM acknowledges the role of dishonest 
advertisements. Another feature of BM is that the market is based entirely on reputation, 
excluding theft or forceful acquisition of commodities. 
Both CA and BM assume that in cooperation markets individuals should show off 
pro-social tendencies in order to acquire access to the most cooperative partners. In a 
recent paper Chiang (2010) contrasted the characteristics of BM and CA (see Table 2.2) 
and presented evidence for the quality effect of partner selection. Self-interest motivated 
participants to preferentially select generous sharers if they were the recipient of a share 
and tolerant recipients if they were the sharer. Moreover, it was theoretically shown that 
free market of partner choice is just one requirement to be met for the emergence of 
fairness. Another crucial aspect affecting cooperation is what partner preferences 
individuals actually have (Chiang, 2010). Reputation-based partner choice can also be 
viewed from the perspective of Fisherian runaway selection. In the original model, 
evolution of some sexually attractive traits is based on positive feedback (Fisher, 1930). A 
preference for a specific trait in the opposite sex makes this trait advantageous and 
stimulates its proliferation. Human pro-social behaviour might have been shaped by social 
runaway selection if the preference to form partnerships with the most cooperative 
individuals was strong enough to induce evolutionary pressure (Nesse, 2007). 
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Table 2.2 Differences between some of the assumptions of CA and BM (adapted from Chiang, 2010) 
2.7. Competitive altruism: theoretical and empirical evidence 
In the original paper Roberts (1998) proposed a way in which CA or reputation-
based partner choice could function. In the first stage, „assessment‟, individuals make 
cooperative displays and evaluate each other‟s quality as a partner. In the second, 
„partnered‟ stage individuals choose a partner and if accepted interact with them. There are 
several assumptions behind CA: (1) individuals need to vary in quality as partners; (2) 
individuals‟ behaviour has to be public and (3) individuals should be able to choose 
partners. If cooperation reflects partner quality, the most cooperative individuals are also 
most desired as partners, and hence, can be more selective when deciding who to interact 
with. Competition for the most cooperative partners results in the escalation of 
cooperation with individuals trying to reputationally outperform each other. Little 
theoretical work has been done on CA. Evolutionary simulations showed that the stability 
of cooperation under conditions similar to CA (where the dismissal of uncooperative 
partners is possible) depends on the composition of behavioural types in a population 
which results from mutations (McNamara et al., 2008). In this model selfishness was 
discouraged by the threat of being rejected as a partner. Barclay (2010) found that a 
population of competitive altruists can invade a population of non-cooperators provided 
that some individuals are at least initially capable of providing non-costly help. 
As Roberts (1998) stated „altruism could persist (…) through competition: competition for the 
attentions of other altruists, competition for mates‟ (p.429). Cooperation as a signal can be attractive 
to potential social and sexual partners. In the latter case, generosity is advertised in order to 
impress attractive mates. It was demonstrated that more cooperative individuals are 
perceived as more attractive and that more cooperation is directed towards more attractive 
than less attractive individuals (Farrelly et al., 2007). Men were also shown to contribute 
Difference Competitive Altruism (CA) Biological Market (BM) 
 
Assessment stage 
 
Every individual is assessed by 
others 
 
Sampling only a set of potential partners, 
sampling techniques affect assessment 
Cheating 
Does not pay off in the long 
run, so should not undermine 
reputation-based systems 
Can impede market mechanism 
Partner selection 
Quality effect: the most altruistic 
individuals preferentially interact 
with each other 
Quantity effect: when choosers outnumber 
potential partners, the partners have an advantage 
in the form of interacting with many choosers 
and vice versa 
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more money to charity when observed by a member of the opposite sex than of the same 
sex (Iredale et al., 2008). With cooperation serving as a mating signal it is difficult to 
disentangle the different motives behind choosing a cooperative partner and even more 
difficult to estimate any long-term benefits associated with cooperative displays. The 
framework with individuals cooperating in order to impress social instead of mating 
partners proved to be more fruitful with regard to producing evidence for CA. 
Barclay (2004) designed three experimental conditions in which participants‟ 
decisions in a social dilemma game preceded (1) an unknown game with other players, (2) a 
game in which it was desired that other players considered the target individual as 
trustworthy (3) the same game based on trust in which additionally participants could 
choose a partner they wanted to play with. Cooperative contributions were higher in the 
two reputational conditions (in which players knew that the other game would be based on 
trust) than in the no-reputation condition. Barclay‟s study also proved that incentives 
behind reputation building can stabilise cooperation. Contributions to the public pool did 
not drop, as usually happens with repeated games, but remained high over a few rounds 
thanks to participants‟ willingness to build up reputation. Hardy and Van Vugt (2006) 
examined the association between individual cooperation and the status in a group. Political 
esteem and social prestige of individuals were positively related to their pro-social 
contributions. Cooperators were also preferred as exchange partners over non-cooperators. 
In another study, by varying the incentive to cooperate (anonymous contribution, public 
contribution and public contribution with partner choice) it was demonstrated that 
participants‟ contributions were related to the motivation to gain cooperative reputation 
(Barclay and Willer, 2007). Apart from showing that the most cooperative participants were 
chosen most frequently as partners, the results suggest that people are sceptical of 
cooperative signals produced in a condition with potential high reputational benefits. 
Although Barclay and Willer‟s (2007) study demonstrated the benefits of reputational 
generosity in the form of easier access to desired partners, the researchers failed to find any 
other advantages of it. Using different methodology Sylwester and Roberts (2010) observed 
that not only do the most cooperative players acquire the socially desirable individuals as 
partners but that they also receive higher returns from those partners. Thus, the short-term 
cost of investing in reputation is recouped in the long-term by engaging in profitable 
interactions. 
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2.8. Conclusions 
In recent years, two lines of research have been developing independently despite 
tackling the same topic of reputation-based cooperation in humans. The two investigated 
theories, IR and CA, were both conceived by biologists but the majority of empirical 
research on IR has been conducted by behavioural economists whereas CA has been 
mostly the domain of evolutionary and social psychologists. IR has received 
disproportionately more attention than CA even considering the fact that it was formulated 
earlier than CA. To provide a crude measure: a search in the Scopus database yields 120 
entries for IR and only 13 for CA. This is puzzling given that CA appears to be a more 
parsimonious and robust mechanism for explaining cooperation than IR. As argued by 
Bshary and Grutter (2006), when viewed from the perspective of communication network 
theory IR is a complex mechanism requiring at least two conditions. First, observers of 
cooperative acts need to gain some personal benefits from the information collected (e.g. 
finding cooperative partners), and second, cooperators need to gain from access to the 
observers. Interestingly, the two necessary assumptions constitute the core of CA. In both 
mechanisms, IR and CA, individuals cooperate in order to be seen as cooperators by others, 
but in IR their cooperative behaviour results in a one-off benefit from the third party 
whereas in CA it results in access to socially desirable partners. 
There are a number of possible definitions of IR which I presented in section 2.3. 
According to Alexander (1987), in its broadest sense, IR may even involve the same 
mechanism of partner choice as CA: “Indirect reciprocity must have arisen out of the search for 
interactants and situations by which to maximize returns from asymmetrical, hence highly profitable direct 
social reciprocity.” (p.97). Any form of non-kin cooperation depends upon a correlation 
between giving and receiving - cooperators must be more likely to be recipients than non-
cooperators. For example, direct reciprocity can only work if it is contingent on the 
cooperative response of a recipient. Otherwise non-cooperators would keep increasing 
their profits by accepting cooperation without reciprocating and in the evolutionary 
perspective would oust cooperators. The easiest way to define IR is by an analogy to direct 
reciprocity. Again, it is only possible for it to work if there is a discrimination - in this case, 
cooperators must cooperate preferentially with those who have cooperated with others 
(image scoring, where individuals cooperate indiscriminately to boost their reputation, is 
unstable, Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003). CA is more 
robust than IR because it accounts for unconditional cooperation. Where CA is different is 
that it invokes two stages in each of which a different social interaction occurs. While in IR 
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individuals must cooperate discriminatingly, in CA, cooperation may be indiscriminate in 
stage 1 because there is no requirement within the stage 1 framework that cooperators 
receive more than non-cooperators. Instead cooperators receive their payback in the 
separate stage 2 based on dyadic interactions with chosen partners.  
IR and CA both aim to explain the extensive cooperation towards unrelated 
individuals observed in humans using a reputation-based framework. Building and 
assessing reputations (in particular second- and higher-order) is a cognitively complex 
activity unlikely to be found in non-human animals. While IR received much more 
publicity than CA, it does not address the phenomenon of unconditional cooperation i.e. 
cooperation towards individuals of no or low reputations. Assessment of individuals in IR 
constitutes an unsolved problem which does not exist in CA. Moreover, the strict 
assumptions of IR seem artificial when applied to human societies where reputation 
transmission often facilitates long-term partnerships and individuals can interact repeatedly 
with the same partner. Although, unlike IR, CA has not gained much attention in terms of 
theoretical modelling, it has a strong conceptual basis in the form of biological markets and 
costly signalling theories. Despite many similarities in IR and CA, researchers publishing 
papers on one of the two theories do not typically address the other one (with the 
exception of Barclay, 2004, Sylwester and Roberts, 2010). There is a need for an empirical 
and theoretical evaluation to examine which of the two theories makes a more likely 
mechanism for interpreting human cooperation. Ideally, the two mechanisms should be 
contrasted in one model or study, so that the effects of the two contexts on behaviour 
could be distinguished and measured. 
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3. Profitable cooperation through competitive altruism 
Explaining unconditional cooperation, such as donations to charities or contributions to 
public goods, continues to present a problem. One possibility is that cooperation can pay 
through developing a reputation which makes one more likely to be chosen for a profitable 
cooperative partnership, a process termed competitive altruism (CA) or reputation-based 
partner choice.  We tested whether people exhibit higher levels of cooperation in the 
presence of reputational concerns and whether investing in reputation pays off. 
Participants played a public goods game (PGG) with varying reputational incentives 
followed by another cooperative game for which they could sometimes choose partners. 
Participants contributed significantly more in the first stage of the game, when they knew 
that their contributions would be revealed to other players in stage two. Moreover, the 
contributions were even higher when participants were told that they would be able to 
choose partners for the second game.  Reputational competition was strongest when it was 
possible for participants to receive a higher payoff from partner choice. Most importantly, 
we showed for the first time that investing in a cooperative reputation can bring net 
benefits through access to more cooperative partners. We concluded that CA provides an 
alternative to indirect reciprocity (IR) as an explanation for reputation-building behaviour. 
Furthermore, while IR depends upon individuals giving preferentially to those of good 
standing, CA can explain unconditional cooperation. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Research on cooperation has shown that people are more generous when they are 
watched by someone or even when they are exposed to images of eyes (Bateson et al., 2006, 
Bereczkei et al., 2007). The rate of cooperation increases also when the identity of the 
individual is revealed (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). Considering these findings, generosity 
appears to be a context-dependent behaviour expressed in the presence of reputational 
incentives. 
One reason why it might pay to be seen to cooperate is indirect reciprocity (IR; 
Alexander, 1987). Experiments have shown that people do indeed prefer to help those who 
help others (e.g. Milinski et al., 2002b). Moreover, investing in reputation pays in the long 
run: despite the initial expense, individuals benefit by receiving more cooperation from 
others in subsequent rounds of IR (Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002). However, problems 
remain with IR as a general explanation for reputation building (Roberts, 1998). In 
particular, IR depends upon cooperation being directed to cooperative individuals, so 
cannot explain displays of unconditional cooperation. 
An alternative theory for reputation formation is that of competitive altruism (CA; 
Roberts, 1998). This theory stresses the role of partner choice for profitable relationships 
and is based on a two-stage process in which individuals first have a chance to build up 
reputations through making generous displays and secondly choose partners for further 
interactions. CA postulates that individuals seek to acquire the best cooperators as partners. 
According to biological market theory such cooperative pairing will be assortative (Noë 
and Hammerstein, 1994). In CA, the benefit of a high cooperative reputation, gained 
through being accepted as a partner, is the return from another cooperative individual in a 
dyadic interaction. 
In support of CA, research has shown that people were more cooperative when they 
expected to play a dyadic trust game with a chosen partner later than when they knew they 
would not be able to choose a partner or when they did not expect to play a further game  
(Barclay, 2004). Another study demonstrated that participants contributed more when their 
contributions were to be revealed to others than when they remained anonymous. It was 
also found that status and social prestige increased in proportion to donations made to the 
group (Hardy and van Vugt, 2006). Finally, by varying whether contributions were 
anonymous or public and whether participants had a choice of partner, Barclay and Willer 
(2007) demonstrated that participants‟ contributions were positively related to the 
motivation to gain cooperative reputation. The study also provided evidence for a 
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preference for the most cooperative players. However, none of these studies has 
demonstrated net monetary benefits from investing in a cooperative reputation.  
Here we investigate the benefits coming from reputation in the form of partner 
choice and payoffs from interactions with partners. The study also involves varying the 
potential gains to be made from a partner to test whether we find an increase in 
contributions when reputation building is followed by higher potential rewards. 
We conducted two experiments referred to as Study 1 and Study 2. Both studies 
consisted of two stages in which participants first had an opportunity to build up 
reputation (Stage 1) and could then to a lesser or greater extent (depending on the 
condition) make use of the information about other players‟ reputations e.g. choose 
partners for further interactions (Stage 2). Study 1‟s aim was to demonstrate that (1) public 
information and (2) partner choice increased cooperative reputation-building behaviour. 
Our findings were consistent with those of earlier studies including Barclay & Willer (2007) 
confirming that we used the appropriate methodology. Study 2 had a different payment 
structure and participants could always choose partners for games with two reward levels.  
3.2. Study 1 
3.2.1. Method 
Participants 
15 groups of four participants (48 women, mean age = 21.04, SD = 2.33 and 12 men, 
mean age = 24.92, SD = 4.89) were recruited from Newcastle University. The groups 
consisted either of females (seven groups) or were mixed (six groups with three females 
and one male and two groups with three males and one female). Participants were 
rewarded with money in such a way that the highest earner in a group of four received £20 
and others received nothing. An informed consent was obtained from all participants and 
they were debriefed after the experiment. 
Design 
Participants played public goods games (PGGs) in a 2-stage within-subjects design. 
In each round participants were endowed with 10 lab pounds. Participants could either 
keep this money, or contribute all or some part of this money to a common pool. The sum 
of the contributions was doubled and shared equally among the players irrespective of how 
much they contributed (each invested pound yielded only 50p to the investor). In Stage 1 
participants played PGGs in a group of four whereas in Stage 2 they played it in pairs with 
31 
 
a person they chose or with an arbitrarily assigned person. Participants‟ contributions from 
Stage 1 were not revealed to other players until Stage 2 took place. Because of this, 
participants‟ decisions in Stage 1 were only influenced by the four experimental conditions. 
In the Anonymous condition round of Stage 1 participants were told that the contribution 
that they made would not be revealed to others at all. In the Public condition round 
participants learned that what they contributed would be visible to other players before one 
round of Stage 2 of the game. The Public condition represents IR framework in which 
cooperation can be indirectly reciprocated by cooperating with an individual of high 
cooperative reputation. In the Choice condition round participants were informed that what 
they contributed would be revealed to other players in Stage 2 before playing a round for 
which they would be able to choose partners. Finally, the Choice-Bonus condition round 
differed from the Choice condition by the fact that in the former participants‟ contributions 
were to be revealed before playing a special bonus round in which the amount put in the 
pool was multiplied by eight and evenly distributed to participants.  
Table 3.1 Four experimental conditions and the incentives to give money in each. 
Condition 
Stage 1 contributions 
revealed to others 
Possibility of choosing 
a partner in Stage 2 
High-stake game 
in Stage 2 
Anonymous no no no 
Public yes no no 
Choice yes yes no 
Choice-Bonus  yes yes yes 
Hence, in Stage 2 there were two reward levels: in the Anonymous, Public and Choice 
conditions the amount in the pool was multiplied by two before distributing it to 
participants while in the Choice-Bonus condition it was multiplied by eight. In both cases, 
although the game retained the form of the PGG, there was no social dilemma. In the 
three conditions with standard payoff each invested pound yielded exactly £1back so an 
individual‟s gain was only affected by their partners‟ contributions. In the Choice-Bonus 
condition the rational choice was to contribute the whole allocation to the pool because 
each individual benefited from their own contribution (each invested pound yielded £4). In 
the Choice-Bonus round the incentive to acquire a cooperative partner was greater because if 
both partners invested everything the final profit could reach four times that of the Choice 
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condition (see Table 3.1). Although, in the Choice-Bonus round, investing everything in the 
public pool was the most payoff-maximizing decision, we expected a variation in 
contributions. Previous studies have shown that people tend to behave imperfectly or 
competitively even if it is in their own interest to cooperate (Kümmerli et al., 2010, 
Kurzban and Houser, 2005). Hence, the unusual structure of the PGG in the Choice-Bonus 
round still provided room for reputation-building behaviour. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, four participants were led to computers separated by screens. 
Anonymity was also ensured by providing participants with experimental nicknames, so 
that any reputation was assigned to nicknames and not to the real names of participants. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). At the beginning, participants read the instructions, in which the nature of Stage 1 
and Stage 2 was explained to them, and were familiarized with the game by playing one trial 
round in which they all were asked to contribute £5. After that, participants played Stage 1 
which consisted of four rounds of PGG, each round representing a different condition (see 
Table 3.2 and Appendix A). The order of conditions in Stage 1 was balanced across 
participants, in such a way that in each round each participant played a different condition. 
In Stage 1 participants did not receive any feedback on how much money other players 
contributed.  
Table 3.2 An example of the order in which PGGs were presented. The order of presenting 
incentives in Stage 1 was balanced across participants. In Stage 2 the conditions were 
presented in the same order for all four participants (P1-P4), but this order was balanced 
between the groups (not shown in the table). Cell entries in Stage 1 refer to the 
information participants received before contributing to PGG whereas cell entries in Stage 
2 refer to the way in which contributions from Stage 1 were used. 
 Stage 1 (group games)  Stage 2 (paired games) 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4  Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
P1 
Contribution 
not revealed 
in  Anonymous 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Public 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice-Bonus 
 
Anonymous Public Choice Choice-Bonus 
P2 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Public 
Contribution 
not revealed 
in  Anonymous 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice-Bonus 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
 
Anonymous Public Choice Choice-Bonus 
P3 
Contribution 
revealed in  -
Choice 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice-Bonus 
Contribution 
not revealed 
in  Anonymous 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Public 
 
Anonymous Public Choice Choice-Bonus 
P4 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice-Bonus 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Public 
Contribution 
not revealed 
in  Anonymous 
 
Anonymous Public -Choice Choice-Bonus 
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After Stage 1, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire which 
allowed the experimenter to transfer their contributions to paper. In Stage 2, participants 
played four rounds of PGG and before each round they received a paper slip from the 
experimenter which either informed them that no contributions are revealed and no 
partner choice is possible, contained players‟ contributions from one round  of Stage 1 but 
partner choice was not allowed, contained contributions and asked them to choose the 
player they would like to be paired with in a game with a standard gain or a bonus gain.  
Participants knew that they would be allowed to play with the chosen person only if the 
person chose them as well; otherwise, their partner would be arbitrarily assigned. However, 
participants did not learn whether they obtained their desired partner or not. The 
conditions in Stage 2 were presented in the same order for all participants in a group but 
their order of presentation was balanced across groups. The results of Stage 2 are not 
analysed as they do not provide answers to our research questions. P values are two-tailed 
throughout the thesis and all the parametric and non-parametric tests were used according 
to whether the data met the assumptions of normality. In some cases (where stated) 
transformations have been use in order to enable parametric tests. 
3.2.2. Results 
Friedman ANOVA showed that contribution levels in Stage 1 changed significantly 
over the four conditions, (3) = 46.23, p < 0.001 (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1 Boxplots presenting median contributions (with quartiles and extreme values) to the 
common pool in lab pounds by condition. 
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Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed that participants contributed significantly more 
in the Public condition (Med = 5, IQR = 4) than in the Anonymous condition (Med = 2.5, 
IQR = 4), z = -3.48, p < 0.04. Contributions in the Choice condition (Med = 6, IQR =4) 
were significantly higher than in the Public condition, z = -2.83, p < 0.04, but did not differ 
from contributions in the Choice-Bonus condition (Med = 5, IQR = 3.75), z = -0.55, p = 
0.58. Contributions in the Public condition were lower than contributions in the Bonus 
condition z = -2.93, p < 0.04. Levels of significance were adjusted using Keppel‟s modified 
Bonferroni corrections (see Keppel & Wickens, 2004). 
3.3. Study 2 
3.3.1. Method 
By rewarding the highest-earner with £20 in Study 1 we intended to encourage 
people to take part in this study and to create a competitive environment. Such a payment 
method could, however, interfere with the incentive to cooperate (Andreoni, 1995) since 
participants were rewarded for earning more than others in their group thereby creating in-
group competition (see West et al., 2006). We therefore recruited ten groups of four 
participants, 14 men (mean age = 24.93, SD = 4.32) and 26 women (mean age = 23.38, SD 
= 3.33) for the second study in which participants received money in proportion to what 
they actually earned during the game.  
Table 3.3 An example of the order in which PGGs were presented. Cell entries in Stage 1 refer to the 
information participants received before contributing to PGG whereas cell entries in Stage 
2 refer to the way in which contributions from Stage 1 were used. 
 
 
 Stage 1 (group games)  Stage 2 (paired games) 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4  Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
P1 
Contribution  
revealed in  
Choice 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice Bonus 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice-Bonus 
 
Choice Choice Choice Bonus Choice-Bonus 
P2 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice Bonus 
Contribution 
not revealed 
in  Choice 
Bonus 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
 
Choice Choice Choice-Bonus Choice-Bonus 
P3 
Contribution 
revealed in  -
Choice 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice-Bonus 
Contribution 
not revealed 
in  Choice-
Bonus 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
 
Choice Choice Choice-Bonus Choice-Bonus 
P4 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice-Bonus 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
Contribution 
revealed in  
Choice 
Contribution 
not revealed in  
Choice-Bonus 
 
Choice Choice Choice-Bonus Choice-Bonus 
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There were two female-only groups, four groups with an equal number of males and 
females, three groups with three females and one male and one group with three males and 
one female. In order to investigate in greater depth the most novel conditions which 
reflected the CA framework, we restricted Study 2 to the Choice and the Choice-Bonus 
conditions (see Table 3.3).  Study 2 had a similar structure to Study 1 with the only 
difference that participants played two rounds of the Choice condition and two rounds of 
the Choice-Bonus condition. Hence, the total number of rounds was the same as in Study 1. 
As in Study 1, participants knew that they would only play with their desired partner if this 
person chooses them as well. We also administered a questionnaire at the end of the 
experiment asking how participants perceived the strategy they adopted while playing the 
games.  
3.3.2. Results 
Participants were ranked within a group according to their contribution (1= top 
contributor). Participants‟ rank was significantly negatively correlated with the number of 
times they were chosen as a desired partner in all four rounds; Choice rounds: rs = -0.34, p < 
0.05 and rs = -0.73, p < 0.01, Choice-Bonus rounds: rs = -0.57, p < 0.01 and rs = -0.61, p < 
0.01. The ranks of participants who were paired with a chosen partner were significantly 
higher than of participants who were assigned a partner in all four rounds (Figure 3.2 and 
Table 3.4).  
Further analyses were conducted on the averages of contributions over the two 
rounds of each condition. Investments made by participants in Stage 1 were strongly and 
significantly correlated with investments by their partners in Stage 2 (r s = 0.59, p < 0.01 for 
the Choice rounds; and, rs = 0.57, p < 0.01 for the Choice-Bonus rounds; Figure 3.3). 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests revealed a non-significant trend suggesting that participants 
contributed more in the Choice-Bonus rounds (Mdn = 7.00, IQR = 3.75) than in the Choice 
rounds in Stage 1(Mdn = 6.00, IQR = 4.38), z = -1.66, p = 0.097.  
Table 3.4 Mann-Whitney U tests showing differences in the ranks of participants who acquired their 
desired partners and those who did not. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
Round U z N assigned N desired 
Choice 1 106.500* -2.396 24 16 
Choice 2 43.000** -3.994 14 26 
Choice-Bonus 1 45.000** -4.213 18 22 
Choice-Bonus 2 99.000** -2.605 24 16 
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Figure 3.2 Boxplots presenting differences between contribution ranks of participants who played 
with assigned (striped boxes) or desired partners (grey boxes). Mann-Whitney U tests 
were significant at p < 0.05 in the Choice 1 round and at p < 0.01 in all other rounds. 
 
  
Figure 3.3 Relationship between participants’ contributions in Stage 1 and their partners’ 
contributions in Stage 2. Regression lines were fitted for the Choice condition (black 
line), Return = 2.69 + 0.59 * Contribution; and for the Choice-Bonus condition (grey line), 
Return = 2.88 + 0.57 * Contribution. 
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3.4. General discussion 
The results of Study 1 support the main hypothesis that generosity is contingent on 
the incentive to build up cooperative reputation when the incentives are dictated by 
competitive altruism theory (Roberts, 1998). Cooperative contributions increased when 
they were going to be revealed to other players in comparison to when they remained 
anonymous (see also Barclay and Willer, 2007). This result alone is congruent with IR - 
individuals were able to reward others for their cooperation in Stage 2. However, when 
active choice of partners based on the information about others‟ contributions was possible, 
individuals displayed even higher cooperation levels. Hence, partner choice, the core 
ingredient of CA, invoked higher cooperation than a mere opportunity to interact in pairs 
with individuals of known reputations. Contrary to our expectations, there was no 
difference in contributions between the two conditions with partner choice but different 
reward levels, Choice and Choice-Bonus. We speculate that the payment method used in Study 
1 did not allow for disentangling the two incentives. In a situation when even the slightest 
difference in profit can make someone a winner and leave others with nothing, what really 
matters is who outperforms others. Although participants could earn different number of 
lab pounds in the two conditions, more lab pounds in the Choice-Bonus condition did not 
translate to more money at the end of the game, as the highest earner would always receive 
£20. It is instructive to see how a manipulation of the payment method can affect 
participants‟ economic behaviour. 
The results of Study 2 support the hypothesis derived from CA that those who 
develop a reputation for generosity acquire cooperative partners and receive more in return 
from them than less generous individuals (Roberts, 1998). To our knowledge this is the 
first empirical evidence for profits coming from reputation building in CA. In Barclay and 
Willer‟s (2007) study partner choice did not elicit high cooperation levels within interaction 
pairs and the authors suggested that repeated interactions were necessary to observe this 
effect: participants could otherwise build a cooperative reputation and then exploit it.  In 
our study there was no incentive to exploit a partner in the Choice rounds, and cooperating 
was directly beneficial in the Choice-Bonus rounds. Nevertheless, a number of participants 
refrained from contributing. Even when the individual return from contributing to a public 
good exceeds the individual return from keeping the endowment, not all people behave in 
the optimal way (e.g. Saijo and Nakamura, 1995). Alternatively, despite detailed instructions 
and a trial round some participants might have not understood the rules of the game.  
According to research on individual differences in cooperativeness individuals belong to 
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one of the three distinct groups that are stable over time: spiteful, payoff-maximizing and 
altruistic (Kurzban and Houser, 2005). Considering this, it is not surprising that those who 
were more cooperative in Stage 1 continued to be more cooperative in Stage 2, while less 
generous participants who could not play with their desired player acquired partners who 
refrained from contributing even though it was in their own interest.  
As expected, reputational competition was stronger when it was possible for 
participants to receive a significantly higher payoff from partner choice; however, this 
effect was not significant when using a two-tailed test. We speculate that this may be 
because investing in a more costly signal is not always the best strategy (Bergstrom and 
Lachmann, 1997). Participants playing Choice-Bonus rounds might have decided that giving 
more would only increase the cost without providing greater long-term benefits. 
Alternatively, people may use different criteria for choosing partners than those proposed 
by CA. It seems logical to expect that the costlier the signal, the more attractive the sender 
of the signal is to the audience (90% of participants who filled in the questionnaire declared 
that they tended to choose individuals who contributed high amounts). However, one can 
well imagine that observers assess the value or the credibility of the signal in a different way 
for example by looking at the signal‟s consistency or its similarity to the observer‟s signals. 
Although in Stage 2 participants could see previous contributions from all Stage 1 rounds 
separately, they could remember the contributions and form a picture of how consistent 
other players were with regard to cooperative behaviour. In the post-study questionnaire 
two participants indicated they actually used this strategy when choosing partners. A 
different criterion used to select partners was choosing someone whose contributions were 
similar to contributions of the chooser which was a strategy used by one participant. 
Considering that two players could only make a pair if they chose each other and otherwise 
they were randomly assigned to a partner, this was a reasonable strategy likely to increase 
the chance of being paired with the chosen person. There is some evidence that positive 
assortative pairing occurs in the mating context where people pursue mates with a similar 
level of attractiveness (see e.g. Little et al., 2001). Such assortative pairing could also be 
present in the social context of acquiring partners for cooperative interactions . 
 In summary, we demonstrated that the level of generosity is dictated by the incentive 
to build up reputation predicted by competitive altruism theory. People do not make 
wasteful displays of generosity, that is, they refrain from cooperation when it does not 
serve any reputational purpose. Moreover, we showed that the short-term investments in 
reputation can be recouped in the long-term through the acquisition of desired partners 
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and profitable interactions with them. Note that our experiment differs fundamentally 
from those on IR (e.g. Wedekind and Braithwaite, 2002, Milinski et al., 2002b) in that the 
benefits of reputation building come from assortative partner choice followed by directly 
reciprocal cooperative interactions. This is a crucial difference because it provides a 
different mechanism for reputation building. IR relies on the use of „moral assessments‟ by 
which individuals decide who is a worthy recipient, despite never having the opportunity to 
receive back. CA, in contrast, relies on the benefits of obtaining the most profitable 
partnerships. Here, we empirically showed that people can indeed reap benefits from 
investing in reputation through CA. The significance of this finding is that displays of 
cooperation can be seen as an adaptive strategy, even when they are not reciprocated either 
directly or indirectly.  
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4. The effect of  resource inequality on reputation-based 
cooperation in social dilemmas 
Previous work shows that reputation-based competition for social partners can be a driving 
force for cooperation. This study examined how reputation-building behaviour varies 
according to differences in resources between individuals playing a social dilemma game. 60 
students played a public goods game with three different endowments, knowing that their 
contributions would be revealed, and that they would have an opportunity to choose 
partners for a further game. Subsequently, participants made partner choices between two 
players whose endowments and contributions were displayed. Next, participants assessed 
players with different resources, who contributed different amounts to the common pool, 
with regard to their pro-social attributions and intelligence. We found that participants low 
in resources contributed proportionally more than wealthier participants. Further, those 
who devoted a larger proportion of their resources to others were judged to be more 
desirable social partners and were perceived as more pro-social but not more intelligent. 
This study demonstrates that within the context of reputation-based competition for 
partners, low-resource individuals invest relatively more in reputation than their high-
resource counterparts and that in an environment with fluctuating resources partner choice 
is affected by the relative cost of an investment rather than its absolute value. 
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4.1. Introduction 
While the literature on human economic behaviour shows that in apparently 
anonymous settings people behave in a moderately cooperative and fair way (Ledyard, 
1995), the level of cooperation increases substantially when behaviour is public (e.g. Barclay, 
2004, Milinski et al., 2002b). One possibility is that public cooperation can pay through 
developing a reputation which makes one more likely to be chosen for a profitable 
cooperative partnership, a process termed competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998). Such 
reputation-based competition for partners has been demonstrated in experimental studies 
(e.g. Barclay, 2004, Barclay and Willer, 2007). Most research on human cooperation 
employed paradigms in which all participants were endowed with the same amount of 
resources that they could spend to enhance private or common welfare. In studies where 
endowments were varied within a group of anonymous players, participants contributed to 
common welfare in proportion to the resources they were endowed with (for a review see 
Yu et al., 2009 ). Here we extended such studies by investigating, for the first time, how 
resource inequality affects cooperation levels in a setting where reputations may be 
important in partner choice. Furthermore, we explored a related question of how people 
estimate others‟ cooperative effort, pro-social attributions and intelligence when 
information about both the amount of possessed resources and the cooperative 
contribution is available.  
4.1.1. Cooperation and fairness in social dilemmas 
In the extensively modelled and used public goods game (PGG), players have an 
option to behave selfishly and keep monetary endowments to themselves, or to cooperate 
and contribute some of their resources to a common pool (Ledyard, 1995). The amount in 
the pool is multiplied by a factor higher than one and lower than the number of 
participants, and then distributed evenly among the players. If everyone contributes, all 
participants reap benefits. However, if some participants refrain from giving to the 
common pool or give little in comparison to others, they take advantage of those who 
contributed generously.  Players‟ behaviour usually falls between the rational and the social 
optimum; i.e. the average contributions in the early stages of anonymous PGG range 
between 40% and 60%  (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This is found even in anonymous games, 
where reputational incentives are excluded.  
When  social norms of cooperation and fairness are violated, group members are 
willing to impose costly punishment on the selfish individuals (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). 
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The social norm of cooperation also applies to a situation when participants have different 
opportunities to cooperate e.g. when due to the experimental setup they have different 
endowments. In this case, participants adjust their pro-social contributions to the amount 
of resources they possess. Participants with unequal resources tend to contribute a similar 
proportion of their endowments; consequently, in the absolute sense the input of 
financially privileged individuals to the public good is higher than the input of less 
privileged ones (Hofmeyr et al., 2007, van Dijk and Wilke, 1995, Yu et al., 2009, Wit et al., 
1992, Van Dijk and Wilke, 1994). Such behaviour is socially desirable in the sense that 
participants with higher endowments are expected to follow the proportionality norm and 
contribute more than participants with lower endowments (Cress and Kimmerle, 2008).  
4.1.2. The role of reputation in social dilemmas and partner choice                                    
In an anonymous setting, participants with different endowments devote a similar 
proportion of their resources pro bono publico (Yu et al., 2009), but whether this holds true 
for situations in which people can build and use reputations has not been investigated. One 
theory as to why people should be concerned about their reputation is that of competitive 
altruism (CA; Roberts, 1998). This concept is based on the assumption that through costly 
advertisements of generosity, individuals increase their chances of forming successful 
cooperative partnerships with other individuals of high cooperative reputations. When 
individuals vary in cooperation, those who wish to interact with the most pro-social ones 
also need to acquire a cooperative reputation in order to be accepted as partners. Therefore, 
when playing economic games with reputational benefits in the form of future partnership 
formation, the level of cooperation is much higher than in anonymous games and non-
anonymous games without the partner choice opportunity (Milinski et al., 2002b, Barclay, 
2004, Barclay and Willer, 2007). It is known that cooperative individuals are indeed more 
often chosen as partners (Barclay and Willer, 2007) and, when the experimental design 
involves free pairing, they acquire the desired partners more often than the uncooperative 
ones (Sylwester and Roberts, 2010).  
Only two studies have investigated how individuals with heterogeneous resources 
and different reputational investments were perceived as interaction partners. In Hardy and 
van Vugt‟s (2006) experiment participants watched four players (who were virtual and 
whose actions were pre-programmed) play PGGs with either high or low endowment. 
Participants were then asked to indicate the player who incurred the highest cost ; to rate 
players with regard to their status; to choose the player they would like to interact with; and 
to distribute £5 between them and the other player. It was found that the player with low 
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resources but relatively high contribution was perceived to incur the greatest cost ; received 
the highest status; was most frequently chosen as a partner; and was allocated the largest 
fraction of £5 (Hardy and van Vugt, 2006). These results suggest that generosity is assessed 
in terms of the relative and not the absolute cost of the investment. However, the 
asymmetry of  that study‟s  design i.e. the fact that low-resource individuals could either 
contribute all of what they had or 20% of their resources whereas high-resource players 
could contribute either 10% or 50% of resources, did not allow for a situation in which 
high-resource players gave the same proportion of resources as low-resource players. The 
study left scope for exploring partner preferences when the choice occurs between players 
of different resources but identical proportions of cooperative contributions. In another 
study participants observed fictitious players punishing an uncooperative individual 
(Nelissen, 2008). Players who spent a high proportion of their resources on punishing were 
entrusted with more money than those who spent a low proportion, or than non-punishers, 
indicating that the relative cost of pro-social behaviour represents one‟s trustworthiness 
better than the absolute cost. 
4.1.3. Perceptions of pro-social attributions and intelligence 
When both the amount of resources and the contribution to the group welfare are 
known, perceptions of individuals can be shaped by two factors: their wealth and 
cooperation level. Although in an asymmetric PGG wealthier individuals tend to contribute 
absolutely more than the poorer ones (Yu et al., 2009), wealthiness in general is associated 
with not being likeable, kind, honest and willing to provide help (Christopher and Schlenker, 
2000, Christopher et al., 2005). This suggests that poorer individuals, especially if they 
spend a large proportion of their resources, should be perceived in a more favourable light 
in terms of various pro-social attributions such as: trustworthiness, reliability, morality and 
cooperativeness. In contrast, wealthy individuals are generally perceived as more intelligent 
than poorer people (Christopher and Schlenker, 2000).  
In psychology, uncooperative or exploitative behaviour has been traditionally 
described as Machiavellianism. People who score high on Machiavellianism are considered 
as more attractive and intelligent by colleagues than people who score low (Cherulnik et al., 
1981). Interestingly, these perceptions do not reflect reality as Machiavellian intelligence is 
not correlated with general intelligence (Wilson, 1996). On the contrary, it has been 
proposed that altruism can function as a costly signal of general intelligence (Millet and 
Dewitte, 2007). Groups who scored higher on a reasoning test cooperated significantly 
more in Prisoner‟s Dilemma games than groups with lower scores (Jones, 2008).   
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4.1.4. Outline and hypotheses 
Our experiment tested the predictions of CA in a scenario where players have 
unequal endowments. In such a setting, low-resource (LR) individuals are disadvantaged in 
the advertising stage of CA. In PGGs without reputation building, participants tend to 
contribute in proportion to their resources. However, to effectively compete for partners, 
the relative cost of a contribution for LR individuals needs to be much larger than for high-
resource (HR) ones. It is important to note that this study did not seek to represent a 
situation in which differences between individuals‟ resources are large and permanent. Our 
study was designed to capture behaviour occurring among individuals of a similar class (e.g. 
students) who happened to possess different amounts of money (which does not mean that 
these amounts reflected their general wealth) and who were faced with a social dilemma 
(e.g. needed to collect money for some purpose). 
We also investigated how participants‟ contribution decisions and resource levels 
affect their desirability as social partners. We examined preferences towards two players 
who contributed the same amount of money in the absolute sense (different relative cost of 
an investment) and preferences towards players who had different resources but 
contributed the same proportion of them (identical relative cost of an investment). Finally 
we tested how players with different resources and contributions are perceived by 
participants with regard to various pro-social characteristics and intelligence. 
Hypothesis 1  
In a CA setting (unlike in PGGs without reputational incentives in which individuals 
contribute in proportion to their resources) players with lower endowments will contribute 
relatively more than players with higher endowments. The contributions will reflect the 
cost required to reputationally compete with others. We predict that LR individuals will 
incur the highest relative cost and HR individuals the lowest relative cost.   
Hypothesis 2  
Preferences for social partners will be shaped by information about both their resources 
and their contributions. We predict that, when the absolute contributions are identical, 
participants will consider players who made a relatively costlier cooperative effort as more 
desirable social partners. The condition when contributed proportions of endowments are 
identical is exploratory; hence, we do not make any specific predictions.  
Hypothesis 3  
Judgments of pro-social attributions and intelligence will be affected by the relative rather 
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than the absolute cost of cooperation. When two individuals contribute exactly the same 
amount of money but differ in their endowments, the one for whom the contribution was 
relatively costlier will be perceived as more cooperative, reliable, moral, and trustworthy 
than their counterpart. In contrast, the individual who spent a lower proportion of their 
resources on advertising generosity will be regarded as more intelligent. When both 
individuals spend the same proportion of their resources, there will be no judgement bias 
in terms of their pro-social attributions or intelligence. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants and payments 
20 groups of three (22 men: M age = 23.59, SD = 8.39 and 38 women M age = 
23.37, SD = 5.93) were recruited for the study through e-mails and advertisements on the 
Newcastle University website. There were five male-male-female groups, six female-female-
male groups, two male only groups and seven female only groups. Each person in a group 
was endowed with a different amount of experimental money, notionally £10 (LR), £15 
(MR) or £20 (HR). Before the game started, participants were told that what they would 
earn in the game would be exchanged for real money at a fixed rate at the end of the 
experiment (participants were not told the exchange rate but were informed that an 
approximate average payment per participant in each group was £6). Because participants 
were arbitrarily provided with different amounts of experimental money, their final payoff 
would necessarily reflect those inequalities. In order to limit any disadvantage that players 
with lower endowment might feel, all participants were asked, after the experiment but 
before revealing the payoffs and debriefing, whether they wished to receive a payment 
according to their experimental earnings or a fixed amount of £6 for participation. Only 
20% of participants chose the fixed payment. The mean payoff per participant was £6.29 , 
SD = 0.88.  
4.2.2. Procedure 
On arrival, participants were seated at computers separated by partitions in order to 
ensure anonymity. Participants were informed that in Stage 1 they would play ten rounds of 
an economic game (which was in fact a PGG), after which their contributions would be 
revealed independently for each round to other players. It is important to note that 
participants were made to think that only their contributions (but not endowments) would 
be displayed. This created an incentive for LR individuals to invest in cooperation relatively 
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more than HR individuals. In fact, both contributions and endowments were revealed 
before partner choice. Next, before the games were played, participants were told that their 
decisions from each round of Stage 1 would be accompanied by a request to choose a 
partner for one of ten rounds of another economic game played in pairs in Stage 2 (see 
Table 4.1). Participants were also told that only if two individuals chose each other, would 
they be allowed to play a round of the last game; if not, they would not play the Stage 2 
round at all and would lose a chance to gain extra money. It was made clear that Stage 1 
endowments would be independent of Stage 2 endowments. Such a design enabled us to 
represent a situation when resources fluctuate over time. Individuals were aware of the 
existing inequalities in resources, so e.g. a person endowed with £10 knew that the other 
two players had £15 and £20. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Before the experiment started, participants were familiarized with the PGG and 
completed a short test in order to ensure that they understood the rules. Then, in Stage 1 
of the experiment, participants played ten rounds of PGG, where they had an option to 
contribute any amount of money between 0 and the amount they were endowed with to a 
common pool or to keep this money to themselves. The amount in the common pool was 
doubled and shared equally among participants, so there was an opportunity to be selfish 
and free-ride on others‟ contributions, but there was also an incentive to contribute a lot in 
order to be chosen as a partner and play Stage 2 rounds.  
Participants were then presented with ten successive choices to make between 
partners based on their endowments and PGG contributions. In order to investigate a 
broad range of combinations of endowments and contributions, we did not use the actual 
contributions made by other players in Stage 1 but instead substituted a predetermined 
series of values. In five presented choices participants could choose between two players 
who contributed identical absolute amounts (identical absolute contributions - IAC). In the 
other five rounds participants could choose between two players whose proportions of 
resources contributed to the pool were identical (identical proportional contributions - 
IPC). For example a person who was endowed with £15 in Stage 1, in one IAC round of 
partner choice could choose between Player A (contribution = 4, endowment = 10) and 
Player B (contribution = 4, endowment = 20).  In contrast, in one IPC round this person 
could choose between Player A (contribution = 2, endowment = 10) and Player B 
(contribution = 4, endowment = 20).
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Table 4.1 Description of the stages of the experiment distinguishing information given to participants before the study and the actual events participants experienced. 
Stage What participants were told about the stages of the experiment What happened in practice 
1 
(PGG) 
10 subsequent rounds of PGG without information about the 
contributions of other players. 
10 subsequent rounds of PGG without information 
about the contributions of other players. 
Partner choice 
10 subsequent choices of partners for the 10 rounds of Stage 2 game 
played in pairs. For each choice, information about other players‟ 
contributions (but not endowments) of one round of the previously 
played PGG is presented. 
10 subsequent choices of partners. For each choice, 
experimentally manipulated information about other 
players‟ contributions and endowments is presented 
in a balanced order. 
2 
(game in pairs) 
10 rounds of an economic game played in pairs. Only if two players 
choose each other, are they allowed to play a round. If not, players 
skip a round and lose a chance of earning extra money. 
Participants fill in a questionnaire. No Stage 2 game 
is played. Participants are debriefed and receive 
payments. 
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In the five rounds of the IAC condition, participants were presented with choices of LR, 
MR and HR players who contributed £2, £4, £6, £8, and £10, whereas in the 5 rounds of 
IPC participants were asked to make choices between players who contributed 20%, 40%, 
60%, 80% and 100% of their resources. The choices were presented in a balanced order i.e. 
IAC rounds were alternated with IPC rounds. For example, a participant with a £10-
allocation in Stage 1 made nine choice of partners between players with the following 
contributions/allocations: 2/15 vs. 2/20, 8/20 vs. 6/15, 8/15 vs. 8/20, 4/20 vs. 3/15, 
10/15 vs. 10/20, 20/20 vs. 15/15, 6/15 vs. 6/20, 12/20 vs. 9/15 and 4/15 vs. 4/20. 
After the partner choice stage, participants were given a short questionnaire to 
complete. In addition to demographic questions, participants were asked to decide who out 
of two fictitious individuals was more intelligent, reliable, trustworthy, moral and 
cooperative. Specifically, participants could select between Player A (endowment = 20, 
contribution = 4) and Player B (endowment = 10, contribution = 4), and then, between 
Player A (endowment = 20, contribution = 10) and Player B (endowment = 10, 
contribution = 5). Participants were also asked whether, after seeing Stage 1 contributions 
of others, they were satisfied with the amounts other players contributed (59.3% of 
participants were satisfied), and whether they expected such contributions or whether they 
were surprised with them (78% said they expected such contributions indicating that they 
considered them to be realistic). 
Participants were informed that the Stage 2 game would not happen and their 
experimental profits would be calculated using the earnings from Stage 1, and that they 
might choose a fixed payment (£6) instead. No participant complained or wished to 
withdraw their data when the nature of the experiment was revealed to them. 
4.2.3. Design and data analysis 
The design was mixed in the sense that in the first part of the experiment three 
participants were endowed with different amounts of money (between-subjects factor) 
whereas in the second part all participants underwent the same experimental conditions in 
a balanced order (five choices in which the absolute cost was identical for the two 
presented players and five in which the relative cost was the same for them).  
To analyze the relative cost of each player‟s contribution we calculated the 
proportion of their endowment that they contributed. We compared the proportions with 
ANOVA, using endowment as an independent factor. We ran the same analysis for the 
absolute contributions in order to investigate whether the absolute contributions directly 
reflected the endowments. The data from the partner choice part of the study and from the 
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questionnaire were analysed using binomial tests that compared participants‟ choices to 
50:50 distributions (no preference). Additionally, a relationship between Stage 1 
endowment and partner preference was examined with chi square tests.  
4.3. Results  
4.3.1. Cooperation cost and endowment 
As expected, we found a significant effect of endowment on the proportions of 
endowment contributed, F(2, 57) = 6.32, p = 0.003.  Planned contrasts showed that having 
a higher than £10 endowment significantly decreased relative contributions, t(57) = -3.41, p 
= 0.001, but there was no difference between £15- and £20-individuals, t(57) = 1.019, p = 
0.312 (see Figure 4.1).  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Mean proportion of endowment contributed in 10 rounds of PGG game by endowment 
level. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
We also found a significant effect of endowment on the absolute contributions, F(2, 
57) = 8.74, p < 0.001. Planned contrasts revealed that while the absolute contributions of 
£20-individuals (M = 10.31, SD = 4.52) were significantly higher than those of £15-
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individuals (M = 6.81, SD = 2.39), t(28.81) = 3.06, p = 0.005, the contributions of  £10-
individuals (M = 6.63, SD =1.82) and £15-individuals did not differ, t(35.53) = 0.26, p = 
0.796. 
4.3.2. Partner preference 
On examining partner preferences in the IAC condition it is clear that participants 
tended to choose those who incurred a higher relative cost of cooperation ( Table 4.2, last 
column).  
 Table 4.2 Frequency of selecting an individual who spent more on cooperation in the relative sense 
(IAC condition: lower-resource individual) and in the absolute sense (IPC condition: 
higher-resource individual) by participants endowed with £10, £15 and £20 in Stage 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
Percentages are displayed separately for different amounts/proportions contributed in the two experimental 
conditions. The penultimate column shows chi square statistics testing the association between one‟s level of 
resources and the desired partner‟s level of resources. The last column presents binomial tests comparing the 
proportion of participants who chose lower-resource individuals as partners in the IAC and higher-resource 
individuals in the IPC to the 50:50 distributions (no preference), * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01. 
For the IPC rounds, as the proportion of the contributed resources increased, 
participants were more likely to choose HR players; a clear preference is visible for rounds 
with 80% and 100% contributions (Table 4.2). In rounds where individuals offered 20%, 
40% and 60% of their endowment, there was a trend towards choosing the HR player but 
no statistically significant preference. Allowing for multiple testing did not alter the 
significance of these results. 
 Amount 
contributed £10 £15 £20 χ2 
Total 
chosen 
IAC 
£2 95% 75% 65% 5.50 0.78** 
£4 90% 60% 70% 4.77 0.73** 
£6 90% 60% 60% 5.71 0.70** 
£8 90% 70% 75% 2.55 0.78** 
£10 90% 60% 70% 4.80 0.75** 
IPC 
20% 40% 65% 55% 2.55 0.53 
40% 40% 80% 60% 6.67* 0.60 
60% 50% 50% 85% 6.91* 0.62 
80% 50% 55% 85% 6.17* 0.63* 
100% 80% 70% 90% 2.50 0.80** 
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Using chi square tests we examined whether partner choices were affected by the 
Stage 1 endowment of £10-, £15- and £20-individuals ( Table 4.2, penultimate column). 
For the five rounds of the IAC condition we did not find any significant effect, but there 
was a stronger tendency for £10-individuals than for £15- and £20-individuals to choose 
LR players. In the IPC condition, in the round with 40% contributions, 80% of £15-
individuals preferred HR players. In the rounds with 60% and 80% contributions, 85% of 
£20-individuals chose HR players as preferred partners. In the round with 100% 
contributions, the majority of all three types of participants preferred HR players as 
partners but this trend was most pronounced in £20-individuals. 
4.3.3. Trait assessment 
When participants were asked to indicate the more intelligent player, in the IAC 
condition they chose the one who bore a relatively smaller cost of cooperation (Table 4.3). 
However, in terms of reliability, morality, cooperation and trustworthiness participants 
tended to select the player who bore a higher cost of cooperation. There was no preference 
for any player with regard to any characteristic mentioned above in the IPC condition. 
Interestingly, some participants were even reluctant to make the forced choice, explaining 
that both presented options were the same. 
Table 4.3 Proportions of participants who chose the low-resource individual (LR) with regard to 
intelligence and pro-social attributions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Binomial tests compare the proportions to 50:50 distributions (no preference) * p < 0.01. In the IAC 
condition participants made a choice between individuals whose contributions/endowments were 4/20 and 
4/10 whereas in the IPC condition the choice was between individuals with contributions/endowments: 
10/20 and 5/10. 
 
Characteristic 
assessed 
LR chosen 
in the IAC 
LR chosen 
in the IPC 
Intelligence 0.23* 0.41 
Trustworthiness 0.88* 0.52 
Reliability 0.78* 0.50 
Morality 0.85* 0.56 
Cooperativeness 0.87* 0.53 
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4.4. Discussion 
Prior studies have empirically established that in anonymous interactions people 
with heterogeneous resources contribute a similar fraction of their endowment irrespective 
of the absolute value of this endowment (Yu et al., 2009). In this experiment we first 
investigated how different resources and the knowledge of the existing inequalities affect 
players‟ cooperative behaviour under the CA framework. The findings indicate that in the 
presence of reputational incentives LR individuals over-contribute to the common pool i.e. 
contribute more than a fair share. As expected, LR individuals contributed a significantly 
higher proportion of their endowments than MR and HR ones. If one had access only to 
information about participants‟ contributions but not endowments, it would not be 
possible to distinguish between LR and MR individuals as their absolute contributions did 
not differ. It would be difficult for LR individuals to compete with HR individuals who on 
average contributed £10.32, but LR individuals managed to effectively outperform MR. 
The fact that LR individuals spent such a large proportion of their resources on 
contributions to the common pool suggests that the relative cost of the cooperative 
investment depends on the perceived competitiveness of others. In the past, it has been 
shown that participants‟ behaviour in the PGG becomes more pro -social when 
reputational incentives in the form of partner choice exist (Barclay, 2004, Barclay and 
Willer, 2007).  Here we found that when participants differ in available resources the 
poorest ones become the most generous in the presence of the incentive to be paired with 
the chosen partners. 
An unanticipated result was that the relative cost of the contribution to the public 
pool did not differ between MR and HR individuals. Why did MR individuals not try to 
compete with HR when presented with an incentive to be able to play another economic 
game and earn extra money? It is plausible that there is a „poorest in the group‟ effect and 
only the lowest-resource individual feels the pressure to devote more resources than others 
in order not to be seen as the least cooperative. Alternatively, LR individuals might have 
had the highest motivation to invest in reputation in Stage 1 and gain high profits in the 
paired game which could compensate for their earlier financial disadvantage.  
Another important result is that participants paid attention to the relative cost of 
the cooperative investment, and showed a preference for players who gave a larger 
proportion of their endowment, supporting previous findings (Hardy and van Vugt, 2006, 
Nelissen, 2008). Preference for lower-resource high-contribution partners indicated that 
desirability is determined by the relative cost of cooperation. Such a partner preference can 
53 
 
yield benefits in an environment where resources are prone to fluctuations because 
choosing poorer but more pro-social players over their richer but less pro-social 
counterparts will yield higher mutual benefits in the long run. An alternative motivation for 
people to choose the less wealthy but more pro-social players may be the willingness to 
punish HR individuals who gave no more than LR ones by preventing them from gaining 
the benefits from a cooperative partnership. This explanation seems reasonable considering 
people‟s willingness to spend money on punishing selfish individuals in a way to reduce 
resource-differences within a group (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). 
In the condition where the absolute value of the contributions differed but the 
relative cost was the same, we found that the preference of higher-resource individuals 
depended on the cost of a cooperative act. There seems to be a conflict between preferring 
those who give a greater proportion of their endowment, on the one hand and preferring 
those who offer more in an absolute sense on the other (shown most clearly by the lower 
half of the last column in Table 4.2). In rounds where players contributed 20% to 60% of 
resources, both potential partners were considered equally attractive. This means that a 
greater absolute value of a contribution is not preferred even when it represents the same 
proportion of different endowments. There is, therefore, a bias favouring LR players. 
However, as the differences in the absolute value of contributions between potential 
partners increase, there comes a point (80%) where the absolute contribution becomes the 
choice criterion. Economic game experiments have shown that the commonly accepted as 
fair and most frequently given contribution in early rounds of PGG is 40%-60% of one‟s 
resources (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Ledyard, 1995). Interestingly, the shift in partner 
preference occurs at a point at which both players should be regarded as unexpectedly 
generous. Thus, in the case of equal proportions of contributions, the absolute cost of a 
contribution appears to affect choice decisions only when both low- and high-resource 
individuals are extremely generous i.e. they are contributing much more than a fair share.  
We found that the amount of resources one was allocated in Stage 1 did affect 
partner choice decisions in the IAC condition to a certain extent; yet none of the chi square 
tests was significant. A noticeable but non-significant bias in £10-participants to choose 
MR individuals (90-95% frequency in all IAC cases) suggests that participants who 
experienced competition with wealthier individuals paid more attention to the 
contribution/endowment ratio than others and appreciated the effort of less wealthy 
individuals sacrificing a high proportion of their resources for the collective good. In terms 
of the choice between proportionally identical contributions, there was a bias in £20-
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individuals to choose MR individuals.  It appears that although participants had known that 
endowments in Stage 1 would be reassigned in Stage 2, they favoured individuals of more 
similar resources. In-group bias predicts that people will favour individuals of their own 
social group (see Yamagishi and Mifune, 2009). In this study participants could not select 
individuals of the same endowment class but participants‟ choices reflect a willingness to 
minimize the distance between theirs and their partner‟s endowment . 
As hypothesized, the relative and not the absolute cost of the investment 
determined which player was perceived as more cooperative, trustworthy, reliable and 
moral, supporting the earlier findings (Christopher et al., 2005, Nelissen, 2008). In line with 
our predictions and reports on the perceptions of people with Machiavellian skills (Wilson 
et al., 1996), HR individuals who made less costly investments and kept more resources to 
themselves were considered as more intelligent than their LR counterparts. Interestingly, 
when the proportions of contributions did not differ between individuals the perceptions 
of their intelligence and pro-social attributions were similar. Such perceptions indicate that 
when assessing pro-social attributions and intelligence people base their judgements on the 
relative and not the absolute cooperative effort, but note that these perceptions might vary 
depending on the way in which people acquired the resources (Smith et al., 2003b). 
One of the most significant findings to emerge from this study is that individuals 
with low resources, when set in a reputation building context, try to keep pace with more 
resourceful players by displaying generosity that is relatively more costly for them than for 
others. These individuals appear to foresee the long-term benefits coming from reputation, 
and decide it is best to invest much more in it in order to be able to compete with others 
(Roberts, 1998). Such a strategy can pay off, because later, the relatively high-contributing 
LR individuals would be preferred for dyadic interactions and would be able to acquire the 
most cooperative partners (Sylwester & Roberts, 2010). The evidence from this study 
suggests that people take into account the relative cost of an advertisement as well as its 
absolute value. Moreover, the relative cost of the investment is positively associated with 
being perceived as cooperative, trustworthy, moral and reliable, but not intelligent. In 
future work, using a wider range of endowments could help to establish whether the effect 
of increasing the relative cost of an investment applies exclusively to the poorest 
individuals.  
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5. The effectiveness of  competitive altruism and 
indirect reciprocity at sustaining cooperation in 
social dilemmas 
Cooperation in social dilemmas can be maintained through a reputational mechanism of 
indirect reciprocity (IR) – a cooperator is likely to become a recipient of cooperative acts 
from others. Here, we propose another mechanism which aids in re-establishing group 
cooperation after a decline: competitive altruism (CA), which proposes that cooperators 
benefit through access to cooperative partners and long-term payoffs from direct 
interactions with these partners. 20 groups of four students played a series of public good 
games which were (1) not alternated with any other game, (2) alternated with an indirect 
reciprocity game or (3) alternated with a direct reciprocity game preceded by partner choice. 
The length of the indirectly and directly reciprocal dyadic interactions was varied. We 
found that contributions to the common pool were higher in the CA than in the IR setting. 
When group games preceded long-term rather than short-term dyadic interactions this 
effect was even more pronounced. Individuals received more from partners in direct than 
indirect games which can explain strong investment in reputation before direct interactions. 
Our findings indicate that strategic reputation building through CA can be a more robust 
mechanism for maintaining cooperation than IR. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Social dilemmas occur when collective interests are in conflict with private interests. 
Numerous studies have shown that, in an anonymous experimental setting, people 
presented with social dilemmas initially tend to cooperate but over time cooperation 
declines (e.g. Ledyard, 1995). In contrast, repeated real life voluntary contributions such as 
charity donations or volunteering (Penner et al., 2005) remain at a relatively stable level. 
What mechanism causes people to continue behaving in a pro-social way?  
From an economic perspective, the most rational choice for an individual is the one 
resulting in them receiving the maximum possible profit. Such a choice usually has a 
negative impact on the profits of others which causes a social dilemma. When, instead of 
investing in public resources, individuals have an opportunity to use them, a „tragedy of the 
commons‟ can occur with people overexploiting the common goods (Hardin, 1968). To 
explain how cooperation in groups could be maintained when individuals are faced with a 
social dilemma two key mechanisms have been proposed: altruistic punishment (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2002) and indirect reciprocity (Milinski et al., 2002b). Here we consider another 
way in which cooperation could be enhanced: reputation-based partner choice, also 
described as competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998). 
Social dilemmas have been extensively modelled with the use of a public goods 
game (PGG). In a standard design, four individuals receive an endowment from the 
experimenter. They can either keep the whole endowment or contribute all or some part of 
it to the common pool. The amount collected in the pool is multiplied by a factor larger 
than one and smaller than the number of participants. Then, the amount is shared equally 
among all individuals irrespective of whether they have contributed (Ledyard, 1995). In 
PGG each individual is tempted to keep their endowment and enjoy the benefits of others‟ 
contributions to the pool. However, the group would be best off if everyone contributed 
their whole endowment. When playing PGGs people initially contribute between 40% - 
60% of their endowments (Ledyard, 1995). After a few rounds contributions tend to 
decline often resulting in everyone keeping their endowment. Research has shown that 
cooperation in PGG can be maintained when individuals can punish or reward others for 
their contributions (Rand et al., 2009, Fehr and Gächter, 2002).  
Another way in which cooperation could be re-established after a decline is due to 
participants‟ motivation to invest in a cooperative reputation. Individuals may be 
encouraged to build up cooperative reputation in order that others indirectly reciprocate 
their cooperative acts. Indirect reciprocity theory (IR) proposes that altruistic acts are 
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reciprocated not by the recipients of altruism but by others who have access to a donor‟s 
cooperative history (Alexander, 1987). In recent publications the definition of IR is 
narrowed down and it is assumed that in IR individuals with high cooperative reputations 
are „rewarded‟ with cooperation from others who by cooperating with cooperators increase 
their own reputation. IR, therefore, predicts that cooperation is directed to cooperative 
individuals (see e.g. Milinski et al., 2002b). 
Experimental studies have provided evidence that people do indeed reward those 
who are generous to others (Seinen and Schram, 2006, Milinski et al., 2001, Wedekind and 
Braithwaite, 2002 ). Milinski et al. (2002b) showed how, thanks to reputation through IR, 
initial levels of cooperation can be successfully rebuilt following a decline. In their 
experiment, participants either played PGGs which were alternated with IR games during 
the whole experiment or, after playing eight consecutive rounds of PGGs participants 
played iterated IR games. In the former case the level of cooperation remained high 
throughout the 16 alternated rounds whereas in the latter case, when, after eight PGG 
rounds, IR games were introduced, cooperation increased to the initial high level (Milinski 
et al., 2002b). 
An alternative to the IR mechanism through which individuals can reap benefits 
from investing in reputation is competitive altruism (CA; Roberts, 1998). According to CA 
theory people build up reputations in order to be chosen by other cooperative individuals 
for profitable partnerships (Sylwester and Roberts, 2010). In CA individuals try to 
outperform each other in cooperation so that they acquire the best partners for dyadic 
interactions. Cooperative acts can be directed to individuals of low or no cooperative 
reputation, it is only important that cooperative and desirable social partners observe such 
displays. Hence, unlike the current interpretation of IR (see Chapter 2), CA does not 
assume that recipients of cooperative acts have themselves high cooperative reputation. In 
CA cooperative investments may function as costly displays or handicaps sensu Zahavi 
(1997). The more one spends on cooperative displays (even towards individuals of low or 
unknown cooperative reputations), the more attractive a social partner one makes (Barclay, 
2004, Barclay and Willer, 2007). Considering this and the fact that the benefits from long-
term interactions with a cooperative partner are likely to be a higher incentive to invest in 
reputation than one-off benefits from indirectly reciprocated acts we tested the idea that 
CA works better than IR at re-establishing cooperation in a social dilemma situation. 
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5.2. Method 
20 groups of four students (35 male, mean age = 24.11, SD = 5.37 and 45 female, 
mean age = 21.84, SD = 4.95) were recruited from Newcastle University to participate in a 
decision-making study with monetary rewards. Participants were taken one by one to the 
computer lab and accommodated in cubicles so that they were anonymous to each other. A 
questionnaire revealed that 88.8% of participants did not have any visual contact with other 
players. Participants were told that they would have £300 lab pounds to play with for the 
whole experiment, and that what they earn would be exchanged to real money at the rate 
£1 real pound = £50 lab pounds at the end of the study. In each round participants could 
use up to £10 lab pounds. On average participants earned £6.73. The experiment was 
conducted using z-Tree software for economic games (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Before the experiment started participants read the instructions and took a quiz 
designed to test whether they had understood them. Specifically, participants were asked to 
calculate outcomes of the games for fictitious players who behaved either selfishly or 
cooperatively (see Appendix B). During the experiment, instead of real names participants 
were known by neutral nicknames (names of chemical elements). After each round all 
participants‟ decisions and profits for the most recent round were displayed publicly for 
30s. The three games used in the study, public goods game (PGG), direct reciprocity (DR) 
and indirect reciprocity (IR) are described below: 
PGG (referred to as ‘Group game’ in the study) 
Participants had an option to contribute £0-£10 to the common pool. The amount in the 
pool was multiplied by 1.5 and shared equally among 4 players. 
DR (referred to as ‘Two-way game’ in the study) 
Participants could choose a partner for this game. If two players chose each other they 
would be informed that their desired partner chose them as well and they would play 
together. If the desired player chose someone else, participants were informed that the 
person they chose did not wish to interact with them and that a partner would be assigned 
to them arbitrarily. Participants were told the nickname of the player they were assigned to. 
When in pairs participants had an option to simultaneously give £0-£10 to their partner. 
The amount given would be multiplied by 1.5 before it reached the recipient. 
IR (referred to as ‘One-way game’ in the study) 
Participants could give £0-£10 to an arbitrarily indicated player. The amount given was 
multiplied by 1.5 before it reached the recipient. Participants knew that there would be no 
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direct reciprocity in this game i.e. if Potassium was a potential donor to Carbon, Carbon 
would never be a potential donor to Potassium but another participant would be able to 
give to Potassium. 
All twenty groups played five rounds of PGG at the beginning and five rounds of 
PGG at the end of the experiment. What differed between the two conditions were the 
middle games which either reflected the indirect reciprocity (IR) or competitive altruism 
setting (DR). Ten groups played five rounds of PGG with each round followed by a DR 
round and five rounds of PGG with each round followed by an IR round. The other ten 
groups played two rounds of PGG, each followed by four rounds of DR with the 
chosen/assigned partner and two rounds of PGG, each followed by four rounds of IR. In 
summary, in a half of the groups reputation gained in a PGG round was linked to a single 
DR or IR round (short-term dyad condition) whereas in the other half it was linked to four 
DR or IR rounds (long-term dyad condition). Additionally, to control for order effects, one 
half of the groups played the competitive altruism condition (PGG alternated with DR) 
first whereas the other half played the indirect reciprocity condition first (PGG alternated 
with IR). We expected a general drop in contributions over time; hence, any alternation 
that occurred later in the experiment would have a weaker impact on maintaining high 
cooperation. In total, participants played 30 rounds of different games (see Table 5.1). The 
details of the procedure can be found in Appendix B. 
Table 5.1 Examples of four possible sequences of playing the games. 
 
 
Our design was close to Milinski et al.‟s (2002b) in that we asked groups of 
participants to play economic games with each other and we alternated PGG rounds with 
IR rounds. Additionally, we alternated PGG rounds with direct reciprocity (DR) rounds for 
which participants could choose a desired partner. We also investigated a situation when 
partner choice led to a longer-term relationship by introducing a few DR rounds played 
with one chosen partner. The main methodological difference between ours and Milinski et 
al.‟s setting was that in our games participants could contribute or donate any amount 
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between £0 and £10 while Milinski et al. used a discrete contribution method – contribute 
all or nothing.  Continuous donations better represent attempts to collect money in the real 
world because the available resources are often divisible. Theoretical studies have shown 
that cooperation is more likely to occur when individuals can calibrate their cooperative 
investments instead of making all-or-nothing decisions (Roberts and Sherratt, 1998, 
Killingback et al., 1999, Roberts and Renwick, 2003). Participants in our study could see 
others‟ contributions but we also provided them with information about how much other 
people earned in each round which was likely to increase within-group competition 
(Nikiforakis, 2010). 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Main analysis 
For the main analysis we used each group of four participants as a statistical unit. 
First, in order to show a decline in contributions over time we compared mean 
contributions in the first and the fifth round of PGG with the paired samples t test. 
Contributions were significantly higher in the first round (M = 5.45, SD = 1.58) than in the 
fifth round (M = 2.95, SD = 2.45), t(19) = 5.93, p < 0.01. Similarly, we found that, when 
considering the final PGG rounds, contributions in the first round (Med = 2.37, IQR = 
3.0) were higher than in the last round (Med = 1.12, IQR = 2.19), z = -2.21, p < 0.05 (due 
to the lack of normality in the distribution of the variables a Wilcoxon test was used). 
Contributions in the first round of a PGG are usually high because of participants‟ initial 
lack of experience or „confusion‟ (see Andreoni, 1995). The decline in contributions over 
time can be explained by conditional cooperation i.e. fine-tuning the level of cooperation to 
others (Fischbacher et al., 2001). For this reason we calculated mean contributions in the 
initial five and the final five rounds and treated them as reference levels. The analysis 
involved mean PGG contributions in four different contexts: the first five rounds, the 
rounds alternated with DR, the rounds alternated with IR and the last five rounds. A mixed 
2(order: DR or IR first) × 4(context) ANOVA applied to groups who were assigned to the 
short-term dyad condition showed a significant effect of context on PGG contributions, 
F(3, 24) = 4.29, p = 0.015. In order to investigate which of the two contexts, IR or CA 
enhanced cooperation in PGG more we did planned comparisons. We used a Bonferroni 
corrected significance of α* = α/N where N = number of comparisons (hence α* = 0.05/3 
= 0.016). In the short-term dyad condition, contrasts revealed that contributions were 
significantly larger when PGG was alternated with DR rounds than with IR rounds, F(1,8) 
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= 13.19, p = 0.007 (see Figure 5.1). Moreover, in the competitive altruism context 
contributions were on average as high as in the first five rounds, F(1,8) = 3.06, p = 0.118 
while when PGG rounds were alternated with IR, contributions were significantly lower 
than in the first five rounds, F(1,8) = 22.58, p = 0.001. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Mean contributions to PGG by game context in short- and long-term dyad condition. Bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals, * p < 0.016. 
There was also a significant interaction between the context of playing PGG and 
the order of alternating with DR and IR rounds F(3, 24) = 5.40, p = 0.006. This indicates 
that contributions in the four investigated contexts were affected by whether PGG was 
first alternated with DR or IR rounds. The difference in contributions between PGG 
alternated with DR and IR was more pronounced in groups where the alternation with DR 
happened before the alternation with IR, F(1, 8) = 26.59, p = 0.001 (see Figure 5.2). 
A similar 2×4 mixed ANOVA applied to groups in the long-term dyad condition 
showed a significant effect of context on PGG contributions, F(3, 24) = 7.86, p = 0.001. 
Contrasts revealed that contributions were significantly larger when PGG was alternated 
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with DR rounds than with IR rounds, F(1,8) = 10.95, p = 0.011 (Figure 5.1).  
Contributions in PGG alternated with DR did not differ from contributions in the first five 
rounds, F(1,8) = 0.08, p = 0.79, whereas contributions in PGG alternated with IR did, 
F(1,80 = 11.54, p = 0.009.  In the long-term dyad condition there was no interaction 
between the order of playing PGG alternated with DR vs. IR and contributions to PGG in 
different contexts, F(3, 24) = 1.50, p = 0.241. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Means and 95% confidence intervals of contributions to PGG followed by DR or IR in 
groups where alternation with DR or IR happened first 
The short-term dyad condition involved five choices of partners. In order to 
investigate whether the choices were consistent across rounds we conducted four chi 
square tests comparing the observed proportion of participants who chose the same or a 
different player as in the previous round and the expected proportion. Because each 
participant could choose among three potential partners we expected that one third of 
participants would choose the same partner by chance. All tests were significant showing a 
high consistency in participant‟s choices (see Table 5.2). Finally, we investigated whether 
experience affected partner choice, that is, whether participants were likely to choose a 
partner they played with in the previous round. In all four cases half of participants wished 
to interact with a participant they played with in the previous round which was significantly 
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more than expected (Table 5.2). We also examined the consistency in choices and the effect 
of experience in the long-term dyad condition which involved only two choices each 
followed by a DR game. The proportion of same choices was not significantly different 
from the expected values (observed: 18, expected: 13.3), χ2 = 2.45, p > 0.05. Participants 
did not choose the partner they played with in the previous four rounds of DR with a 
probability higher than chance (observed: 17, expected: 13.3), χ2 = 1.51, p > 0.05.  
Table 5.2 A comparison of observed and expected choices of the same partner that was chosen in the 
previous round and choices of  the same partner with whom one played with in the 
previous round in DR games (short-term dyad condition). 
 
* p< 0.05, **p<0.01 
 
Table 5.3 A comparison of donations received in DR game between participants who decided to stay 
with a partner they played with in the previous round and those who preferred to change 
the partner in the short-term dyad condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
* p< 0.05, **p<0.01 
In the traditional one-shot design of competitive altruism individuals build 
reputation in one stage and use it in the next one. In this experiment, because of repeated 
DR rounds, participants could both use a reputation built earlier in order to acquire a 
cooperative partner and by behaving cooperatively, build reputation for the future rounds. 
Hence, partner choice could have been determined by reputation gained in DR rounds. 
comparison 
between rounds 
observed number of 
participants who made the 
same choice of partner in 
two consecutive rounds 
observed number of 
participants who chose the 
partner they played with in 
the previous round 
expected 
values 
Chi square for 
interaction 
between two 
consecutive 
choices 
Chi square for 
interaction 
between previous 
game partner and 
current partner 
choice 
 
1st vs. 2nd 
 
26 
 
20 
 
13.3 
 
18.05** 
 
5.00* 
2nd vs. 3rd 23 20 13.3 10.51** 5.00* 
3rd vs. 4th 22 20 13.3 8.45** 5.00* 
4th vs. 5th 22 20 13.3 8.45** 5.00* 
Comparison 
between rounds 
T 
M(SD) stayed with 
partner 
M(SD)changed 
partner 
 
1st vs. 2nd 
 
-1.55 
 
6.0(3.45) 
 
4.40(3.08) 
2nd vs. 3rd -1.20 5.30(3.18) 3.95(3.89) 
3rd vs. 4th     -3.05** 6.1(3.45) 2.8(3.40) 
4th vs. 5th   -2.15* 5.7(4.05) 3.2(3.25) 
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Indeed, we found evidence suggesting that high donations from a partner in DR games 
contributed to this partner being chosen again. In the short-term dyad condition, 
participants who had received higher donations from partners in DR tended to choose the 
same partners again while those whose partners had given lower donations tended to 
choose different players for the next round (a trend present in the first two comparisons 
and a significant difference in the last two in the short-term dyad condition, see Table 5.3). 
Similarly, in the long-term dyad condition we found that participants who received on 
average higher donations from a partner they had played with in the previous four rounds 
(M =5.82, SD = 2.98) tended to choose this partner again while players who had received 
on average lower donations (M = 3.73, SD = 2.52) were inclined to choose a different 
partner for the next four rounds, t(38) = -2.40, p = 0.021. 
 
Figure 5.3 Mean donations to a partner in DR and IR rounds by condition. Bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
We compared the mean amounts given to partners in DR and IR rounds 
irrespective of whether in DR individuals were paired with their desired partners. A paired 
samples t test indicated that in the short-term dyad condition, donations in IR (M = 2.07, 
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SD = 2.46) were significantly lower than donations in DR (M = 4.57, SD = 2.42), t(9)= -
4.45, p <0.01, (log transformation was used to satisfy the assumption of normality ). A 
similar effect was found in the long-term dyad condition: DR (M = 4.47, SD = 2.13) vs. IR 
(M = 1.90, SD = 1.66), t(9)= 4.63, p = 0.001, (see Figure 5.3). 
5.3.2. Additional analysis  
It was not the aim of our study to empirically test CA theory but rather to assess its 
relative power in comparison to IR in terms of enhancing cooperation in social dilemmas. 
Nevertheless, we did a few additional analyses to test whether the predictions of CA held as 
in previous studies. We focused on the first round of PGG alternated with partner choice 
followed by direct reciprocity (DR) because partner choices in the further rounds were 
likely to be affected by reputation built not only in the PGG but also in the previously 
played DR rounds.  
We first tested whether the most cooperative players in the PGG were more likely 
to be chosen as partners for the following DR game. PGG contributions in each group 
were ranked from 1 (lowest contributor) to 4 (highest contributor). We found a significant 
positive correlation between contribution rank and the number of times a player was 
chosen as the desired partner by others in the group, rS (38) = 0.31, p < 0.05 (short-term 
dyad condition), rS(38) = 0.61,  p < 0.01(long-term dyad condition). We expected that the 
tendency to rely on costly investments in reputation when choosing partners would be 
more pronounced in the long-term than in the short-term dyad condition. This is because 
we inferred that the advantage of choosing a cooperative partner for four rather than one 
round of a direct exchange would be higher; therefore the motivation to profit from the 
direct exchange would be reflected in the strength of correlation.  By calculating the 
difference between the two correlation coefficients using the Fisher r-to-z, we found a non-
significant tendency for the correlation in the long-term dyad condition to be stronger than 
in the short-term dyad condition, z = -1.67, p = 0.09. We also investigated whether the 
most cooperative individuals were more likely to be paired with their desired partners. The 
ranked contributions were recoded in two groups: ranks 1, 1.5, 2 and 2.5 were categorized 
as low contributors, ranks 3, 3.5 and 4 as high contributors. Due to the low expected count 
we performed one chi square test on data from both short- and long-term dyad conditions. 
We found a significant interaction between players‟ contribution category and being 
accepted by a desired partner, χ2 = 6.88, p < 0.01 (see Table 5.4 for exact values). 
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Table 5.4 Cross-tabulation showing the number of participants with different contributions who  
were accepted or not by their desired partners. 
 
Played with the 
desired partner 
Did not play with 
the desired partner 
Low  contribution 14 35 
High contribution 18 13 
 
Finally, we were interested in whether the opportunity to play with the chosen 
partner for four rounds in contrast to one round would provide a higher reputational 
incentive and elicit higher cooperation. Contributions in the first PGG round in the CA 
context in both short-term and long-term dyad conditions (round number 6 in Table 5.1) 
were aggregated by group. Participants tended to contribute more in the long-term (M = 
4.1, SD = 2.67) than in the short-term (M = 3.42, SD = 3.09) condition, however, this 
trend was not significant, t = -0.52, > 0.05. A larger sample size might be needed to capture 
this effect. 
5.4. Discussion 
Our results show that the opportunity to choose partners for a dyadic interaction is 
a stronger incentive to invest in reputation than IR. This finding suggests that CA is a more 
efficient mechanism than IR for maintaining high contributions in social dilemmas, and 
possibly for explaining the evolution of reputation-based cooperation. In the present study 
we only compared strategic IR with CA. However, it has been shown that IR exists even 
without reputational incentives in which case it is called „pure IR‟ – helping in order that 
the recipient helps another individual while the helper‟s image score is not made public 
(Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009). Considering that cooperation levels in pure IR are 
lower than in strategic IR (Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009); and that humans did not 
evolve in an environment where individuals‟ cooperative reputations were kept private, the 
mechanisms involving strategic reputation building seem to provide a more plausible 
explanation for the development of human cooperation than those involved in IR. Unlike 
IR, CA is purely strategic in assuming that those who cooperate more will acquire more 
cooperative partners and form more beneficial partnerships than selfish individuals 
(Roberts, 1998). 
In our experiment, IR was clearly less efficient at re-establishing high levels of 
cooperation than in Milinski et al.‟s (2002b) study. In previous research, the continuous 
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contribution method we used here was found to induce more cooperation in PGG with a 
provision point (where participants‟ contributions need to exceed a certain amount in order 
for the group to receive a reward) than the discrete all-or-none contributions (Cadsby and 
Maynes, 1999). It is not then likely that our contribution method lowered contributions in 
PGG when it was followed by IR. On the other hand, we not only presented all 
participants with information about contributions of all players but also their profits in 
each round which might have led to reduced levels of cooperation in general (Nikiforakis, 
2010), but again it should not have affected exclusively the PGG followed by IR. Milinski 
et al. (2002b) showed that (1) when social dilemmas are alternated with IR from the very 
beginning, cooperation levels in PGG remain stable; (2) while cooperation in iterated social 
dilemmas drops, when iterated IR games are introduced, it increases and remains at a high 
level in IR (not in PGG, hence PGG is not a reference level). In contrast, our study 
investigated whether, after a decrease in contributions in iterated social dilemmas, 
alternating them with IR or DR rounds can restore cooperation (the reference level was 
always cooperation in PGG and not in IR or DR games). It is then worth stressing that the 
question of whether cooperation in social dilemmas can be rebuilt after a decline can only 
be answered using our design. This results from the fact that in Milinski et al.‟s (2002b) 
design the decline in cooperation in PGG rounds was followed by an increase in 
cooperation in IR rounds and not in PGG rounds alternated with IR. 
Interestingly, in the condition in which individuals formed short-term one-round 
dyads in DR and IR, the order in which PGG was alternated with DR and IR strongly 
affected PGG contributions. When, after the initial five PGG rounds, participants played 
PGG rounds alternated with IR rather than DR, the alternation with IR yielded similar 
levels of cooperation to the alternation with DR. One possible explanation for this pattern 
is that cooperation dropped so much after five PGG rounds and five PGG rounds 
alternated with IR rounds, that short-term dyadic interactions in CA were too weak an 
incentive to restore it. Because individuals known by nicknames started acquiring 
reputation from the first round, cooperative decisions and partner choices were based not 
only on the behaviour in the preceding PGG round but also on the overall cooperative 
image built throughout the game.  
In the short-term condition participants were consistent in their choices of partners 
for DR rounds and often played with the partner from the previous round. Such a 
consistent matching system made the short-term dyad condition similar to the long-term 
dyad condition in the sense that the likelihood of staying with the same partner for a few 
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rounds, despite updating the choices in each round, was high. Interestingly, in the long-
term condition the two choices made were not consistent. Partner choice was clearly 
affected not only by reputation built in PGG but also by experience and the possibility of 
partner control (encouraging cooperation with a threat of terminating an interaction) in 
repeated DR rounds: participants who received relatively high donations from their 
partners in DR rounds were likely to stick with those partners and choose them again. In 
long-term CA, individuals can use both reputation and experience to decide who would 
make a good partner. 
Investing in reputation in the PGG rounds preceding DR rather than IR can be 
explained by higher donations to partners in DR than in IR games regardless whether 
participants were allowed to play with the desired partner or not. Participants preferred to 
give to someone who had a chance to reciprocate directly rather than indirectly which 
suggests that they were more willing to build first-hand rather than second-hand reputation. 
This result supports previous models which showed that when a possibility of re-meeting 
exists individuals are more likely to rely on experience than reputation (Roberts, 2008). 
Therefore, it pays off to invest more in reputation when there is an opportunity for direct 
interactions. 
In conclusion, this study extended research by Milinski et al. (2002b) by showing 
that the mechanism of CA allows for restoring initial cooperation levels better than IR. 
Participants invested more in reputation used for DR than IR games and received more 
cooperation in DR than IR games. All effects appear to be stronger when there is a 
possibility of establishing long-term partnerships. Human CA has been shaped in a natural 
environment where a chance of re-meeting was high, long-term social interactions could 
occur, and because of time constraints only a few out of many potential partners were 
needed (e.g. the number of people with whom an individuals can maintain a stable social 
relationship is limited, see Dunbar, 1998) . This study showed for the first time that the 
opportunity to form long-term dyadic interactions with a desired partner can have a 
considerable effect on sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas.  
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6. Memory bias for reputational gossip:              
Cheater-detection or rarity-detection? 
Language enables indirect monitoring of others‟ behaviour and may thereby contribute to 
social policing in groups. Through transmitting information about others ‟ cooperative 
reputations individuals can make better decisions regarding who to interact with and avoid 
exploitative individuals. Profitable coalitions translate to fitness benefits hence natural 
selection should promote cognitive mechanisms that allow for quick detection, memory 
storage and effective reconstruction of reputational information. Here we investigated 
differences in the recall rate of non-social, non-reputation social, positive reputation and 
negative reputation information.  96 student participants were asked to listen to eight 
recordings of conversations involving different types of information. After a distracter task, 
they were asked to recall and report as much information as they could. We manipulated 
the perceived cooperativeness of the environment by exposing participants to cooperative 
or uncooperative game partners prior to the listening task. Positive and negative 
reputational information was recalled with a higher accuracy than non-reputational social  
information but the recall rate of non-social information confounded this result. Names 
associated with different types of conversations were recalled most accurately for negative 
reputation, less accurately for positive reputation and the least accurately for non-
reputation social and non-social information.  Exposure to cooperative and uncooperative 
environments did not affect recall rates. We discuss the results with reference to the 
Machiavellian intelligence/social brain hypothesis and the debate over human cognitive 
sensitivity to cheaters versus sensitivity to the rarer cooperative type in the group. 
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6.1. Introduction 
„No one gossips about other people's secret virtues.‟  
Bertrand Russell  
In everyday life people often rely on third-party information relating to 
evolutionarily important matters such as resource acquisition, diseases or potential sexual 
and social partners. About two thirds of conversation time is devoted to social topics 
which suggests that people value information about others‟ personal and social lives and 
are interested in spreading such information about themselves (Dunbar et al., 1997). 
Moreover, cultural transmission of social information, generically labelled as gossip, is more 
effective than non-social information which indicates that broadcasting the former might 
have played an important role in human evolution (Mesoudi et al., 2006). Considering the 
amount of time spent gossiping and the effectiveness of gossip transmission, it is tempting 
to assume that gossip contributed to the evolution of human ultra-sociality. According to 
Dunbar (1993) complex social networks enforced the increase of neo-cortex size and the 
evolution of language which allowed for a high level of cooperation in human groups.  
The role of gossip in the evolution of human cooperation among unrelated 
individuals rests on two functions of language: bonding and social policing. It has been 
proposed that language in humans bears functional similarities to grooming in non-human 
primates (Dunbar, 1996).  By enhancing social bonding, verbal communication positively 
affects cooperation even if individuals are strangers and when it pays to be selfish. In 
experimental games, levels of cooperation increase dramatically when communication is 
allowed (for a review see: Ostrom, 2003, and Sally, 1995). Discussing optimal strategies 
could potentially account for higher cooperation in groups who can chat; but cooperation 
levels seem to be enhanced even more by physical closeness. Experiments show that what 
really matters in solving social dilemmas is the modality in which information is transferred 
and whether the communication occurs via computer or face-to-face (Jensen et al., 2000, 
Bicchieri and Lev-On, 2007).The fact that the physical contact during the transmission 
affects cooperation stronger than the content of the transmitted information emphasizes 
the bonding role of gossip in the development of pro-social behaviour. 
In complex social groups consisting of over 150 individuals, cognitive skills do not 
allow for directly following everyone‟s reputation and direct social policing (Dunbar, 1993).  
The stability of such groups is potentially endangered by free riders who exploit others and 
move away to find an inexperienced victim. However, when information about free riders‟ 
reputation can be spread, their success decreases and cooperation becomes stable (Enquist 
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and Leimar, 1993). It has been postulated that the main role of gossip in modern societies 
is managing reputations (Emler, 1990). Although, when gossiping, people devote only 
about 3% - 4%  of time to spreading negative opinions about others (Dunbar et al., 1997); 
evidence from economic experiments suggests that the possibility of gossip successfully 
discourages people from free-riding and promotes cooperation (Piazza and Bering, 2008). 
In order to use gossip as a policing tool, third-party information needs to accurately reflect 
individuals‟ behaviour. It has been shown that information obtained from others can be a 
reliable substitute for direct observation (Sommerfeld et al., 2007). However, gossip is 
prone to manipulation and for this reason humans use  a set of assessment techniques to 
verify its veracity (Hess and Hagen, 2006, Sommerfeld et al., 2008). In further support of 
the policing function of gossip it was demonstrated that people disapprove of self -serving 
gossip but approve of gossiping in response to norm violation (Wilson et al., 2000). If 
gossip plays such a significant role in social control, information about reputation should 
be transmitted with higher precision than other social information. Mesoudi et al. (2006) 
found that social information was passed on through transmission chains with a higher 
accuracy than non-social information supporting the social brain (Dunbar, 1998) or 
Machiavellian intelligence (Byrne, 1996) hypothesis. However, no evidence was found for 
the strong version of the social brain hypothesis which predicted a bias for gossip about 
norm-violating behaviour in comparison to everyday social behaviour information. 
 Policing through gossip can function successfully if people pass information about 
others‟ cooperative and selfish acts.  However, it is also crucial that people store this 
information, so that when encountering an individual, they can easily retrieve this 
individual‟s reputation from memory and adjust their behaviour accordingly. In past 
research Tooby and Cosmides (1992) promoted the concept of a „cheater detection‟ 
module in the human brain which would allow for quick identification of social norm 
violators.  A number of studies supported this idea by reporting that humans display 
cognitive sensitivity to faces of cheaters (Yamagishi et al., 2003, Mealey, 1996, Chiappe et 
al., 2004, Verplaetse et al., 2007). Other researchers provided evidence for the existence of 
altruism detection ability independent of the cheater detection one (Brown and Moore, 
2000, Brown et al., 2003) or a cognitive bias to cooperators affected by social context 
(Felisberti & Pavey, 2010). The idea of specialized areas in the brain responsible for either 
cooperator or cheater detection has been challenged by Barclay (2008) who showed that 
sensitivity to faces of cooperators and defectors depends on their frequency in the 
environment. Members of the group which was in the minority were more frequently 
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recognized as previously seen and more accurately identified with regard to their pro-
sociality than members of the larger group. Interestingly, in the condition with equal 
number of cooperators and defectors, cooperators were remembered marginally better 
than defectors.  This finding pointed to a more general reputation-tracking mechanism that 
relies on focusing on the less frequent behaviour, which in human societies is defecting 
rather than cooperating.  
A different approach to the recognition of cooperative intentions was adopted by 
Frank (1988). Frank considered populations with different proportions of cooperators and 
defectors and different cooperative intention recognition abilities. If cooperators and 
defectors look alike and the payoff of defection is higher than the payoff of cooperation, 
cooperators will become extinct. In contrast, if coopeerators and defectors are easily 
identified, cooperators will preferentially interact with each other and oust defectors. If 
defectors learn to mimic cooperators, again, cooperation will vanish. The most interesting 
of frank‟s examples is when there is a cost of a scrutiny of cooperative intentions. Frank 
noticed that engaging in such costly examination of intentions would depend on the 
proportion of cooperators and defectors in the population. The proportion of cooperators 
must be sufficiently low for the costly examination to occur, because with a high 
proportion of cooperators an individual will often interact with them by chance. Only 
when the cost of scrutiny is lower than the cost associated with frequent interactions with 
defectors, will such scrutiny take place. It is worth noting that according to Frank it will 
never pay for defectors to costly scrutinize others. This is because, with a low number of 
cooperators who assess cooperative intentions, a defector will be scrutinized and rejected 
as a partner. 
A cognitive bias towards detecting cheaters or cooperators in the environment 
could also be modulated by individuals‟ own cooperative behaviour. Exploitative 
individuals might, for example, be more aware of the possibility of being exploited by 
others than pro-social individuals and for this reason might focus more on cheaters than 
cooperators. It has been shown that people can be divided into three stable and distinct 
cooperative types: spiteful, payoff-maximizing and altruistic (Kurzban and Houser, 2005, 
Simpson and Willer, 2008).  Pro-social inclinations are measured using the Social Value 
Orientation scale (SVO) which categorizes individuals into competitors, pro-selves and 
pro-socials (Van Lange et al., 1997).  Whether individual pro-social predispositions affect 
the cognitive decisions involved in detecting cheaters and cooperators is currently 
unknown. 
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The present study was inspired by the concept that human cognitive skills evolved 
to solve social problems that occur in complex groups (Mesoudi et al., 2006, Dunbar, 
2004); and by the debate over the cognitive mechanisms involved in social policing (Barclay, 
2008). We first intended to test the strong version of the social brain hypothesis which 
assumes that information about norm violators is more likely to be attended to and 
transferred than other types of information. Mesoudi et al.‟s (2006) findings support the 
soft version of this hypothesis – bias in transmitting social in comparison to non-social 
information. However, the researchers did not find that gossip-like information (describing 
an affair of a student with her professor) was transmitted with a higher accuracy than non-
gossip social information as predicted by the strong version. The content of Mesoudi et 
al.‟s example might not have tapped the exploitative nature of human social relationships as 
it referred to sexual rather than cooperative reputation. To test the strong version of the 
social brain hypothesis we investigated the recall rates for conversations involving non-
social, non-reputational social and social reputational information in which reputations 
referred to an individual‟s pro-sociality and fairness. We predicted that information about 
cooperative and uncooperative acts and names of actors performing them would be 
recalled with higher accuracy than all other types of information and the associated names. 
Secondly, we addressed the question of whether humans are more sensitive to 
gossip about cheaters or cooperators or whether the sensitivity is contingent on the 
experience one is exposed to. If humans are specialized cheater detectors they should be 
able to recall the information regarding the negative reputation and the names of actors 
performing uncooperative acts with higher accuracy than other kinds of information. If, 
however, people use the more parsimonious „focusing on the rarity‟ rule they should 
selectively attend to and memorise information about the group that is in the minority 
(Barclay, 2008). In this case, we would predict that people exposed to an uncooperative 
environment would recall information about cooperative acts and the names of actors 
performing them with higher accuracy than information and names associated with 
cheating and vice versa. An alternative prediction follows from Frank‟s (1988) frequency-
dependent costly scrutiny. According to Frank with a high proportion of cooperators no 
sensitization to cooperative intentions should occur. When the proportion of cooperators 
is low, they should become able to distinguish cooperators from defectors.  
To determine which mechanism people use to assess others‟ cooperative intentions 
we primed participants with a cooperative, uncooperative or neutral environment, after 
which we exposed them to conversations involving gossip about positive and negative 
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reputations of others, and measured the recall rate. This study served as a critical test 
between the two competing hypotheses, cheater detection and rarity detection, and aimed 
to determine which of them was correct. We also administered the SVO scale in order to 
test whether individual pro-social predispositions affected recall rates (Van Lange et al., 
1997), but because this analysis was exploratory we did not make any specific predictions. 
6.2. Methods 
6.2.1. Participants 
86 female and 10 male student participants (M age = 20.22, SD = 1.87) were 
recruited at Newcastle University via e-mail. The study was directed to English native-
speakers and advertised under the title „Intensive listening and performance in simple tasks‟ . 
Participants completed it individually and were rewarded with module credits and small  
payments based on their performance in various tasks.  
6.2.2. Material  
After the priming stage (described in the Design and procedure section), 
participants listened to eight conversations which represented four conditions (two 
conversations per condition). The conversations contained (1) non-social information 
defined as a technical description not involving social interactions with others; (2) social 
information without reputation information (referred to as no reputation) which involved 
interactions with others but did not reveal anything about the target‟s social reputation 
(neither in terms of cooperative tendencies nor social status and sexual behaviour); (3) 
social positive reputation in which the described individual behaved in a pro-social or 
altruistic way, or (4) social negative reputation which included acts of cheating or exploiting 
others (see Appendix C for examples). Conversations involved different names of the main 
characters and were matched with regard to the number of words and propositions (units 
of meaning). The conversations were acted by two female English native speakers and 
recorded. Each conversation would start with an introductory question by Actor A e.g. 
„Have you heard about Alex/Ann?‟ after which Actor B expressed interest e.g. „What 
happened?‟ and Actor A replied by presenting the target story. Conversations were 
presented in a balanced order. We used eight different orders in which both the sequence 
of conversations and the sex of the characters were varied. Two conversations of the same 
type were never presented in a consecutive order. The main character of the conversations 
was either a male or a female (two all male sequences, two all female sequences and four 
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mixed sequences in which the sex of cooperators and defectors was balanced) with the 
exception of the non-social conversations (involving a technical description of an activity 
by Actor A) in which only females were featuring.  
The collected scripts with recalled conversations were compared to the original 
ones. We calculated the number of correctly recalled propositions in each conversation (i.e. 
all relevant units of meaning reported in any order). Any incorrect information reported 
was discarded. A proposition was defined after Kintsch (1974) as a semantic unit which 
conveys meaning (see also Mesoudi et al., 2006). Propositions contain predicates, which 
usually describe the objects and the relationships between them, and arguments, which are 
the objects themselves e.g. a sentence „John gives money to a local charity‟ would be 
propositionally encoded as: gives (John, money), to a charity (money), local (charity). All 
target stories consisted of 10 propositions, 33-38 words and 3-4 sentences. We also 
collected data on the names correctly assigned to conversations. If a participant provided 
only a name without any reference to a conversation in which it appeared, they did not 
score a point. 
6.2.3. Design and procedure 
 Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: cooperative, uncooperative 
or neutral environment. Those who were exposed to a cooperative or uncooperative 
environment played 42 rounds of a Prisoner‟s Dilemma game (PD) with a virtual partner 
who either cooperated in 80% or 20% of rounds. In PD participants could decide whether 
they wished to cooperate or defect. Participants received the lowest payoff if they 
cooperated and their partner defected, a higher payoff when both players defected, an even 
higher payoff when both cooperated and the highest payoff when they defected and their 
partner cooperated. The points earned in this task translated to real money which, together 
with earnings from other tasks, were summed after the experiment. Participants received an 
e-mail informing them about the amount of money they earned and asking to arrange an 
appointment with the experimenter to collect the payment. 
Participants in the control condition (neutral environment) were asked to do 20 
mathematical calculations which took a similar amount of time to playing PD. Next, 
participants were asked to listen to eight conversations (each lasted between 16s and 19s), 
of which some involved information about individuals‟ positive or negative reputations. 
Participants were asked to press „Play‟ when they were ready to listen to a conversation and 
„Continue‟ after they finished in order to proceed to the next conversation.  
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Figure 6.1 Diagram showing different stages of the experiment. 
After listening to the conversations participants were distracted by doing complex 
calculations for 15 minutes. Then, they were asked to recall as much as they could from the 
eight conversations that they heard and write it down in any order in the eight boxes 
provided on the same webpage (the boxes were not labelled in any way). Participants were 
encouraged to take as much time as they needed to complete this task. After that, 
participants completed the SVO scale and a questionnaire in which they had to indicate 
their familiarity with the situations described in the conversations i.e. they were asked to 
indicate on a Likert scale how often they perform or see someone else performing the 
activities described in conversations (e.g. the response to a question how often a person 
donates blood ranged from never to regularly). The study was computerized using the 
Qualtrics software for questionnaires (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT) and z-Tree for the 
PD game (Fischbacher, 2007). For a diagram of the procedure see Figure 6.1. 
6.3. Results 
Overall, the recall task proved to be relatively difficult: participants managed to 
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recall at least one piece of information from on average 4.68 conversations (out of 8 
conversations, SD = 1.55). Scores of the recall rates from two conversations of the same 
condition were pooled into one variable.  
 
 
Figure 6.2 Mean recall rate for conversation content with 95% confidence intervals by condition.  
The maximum score for content in each scenario was 10.* p < 0.012 
 The distribution of the variables tested was non-normal and none of the 
transformations improved the normality. We decided to use a mixed ANOVA model 
because it is relatively robust to departures from normality in particular when the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances is satisfied as in our data (Howell, 2002). A mixed 
4(conditions: negative reputation, positive reputation, no reputation, non-social) × 
3(environment: uncooperative, cooperative, neutral) ANOVA was applied to the content 
recall and then to name recall. We found a significant effect of condition on the rate of 
content recall, F (3, 279) = 8.83, p < 0.001 (see Figure 6.2). To further investigate the effect 
of conversation content we did planned comparisons between the different conditions. We 
used a Bonferroni corrected significance of  α* = α/N where N = number of comparisons 
(hence α* = 0.05/4 = 0.0125). Content recall accuracy was significantly different from 
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other conditions only in the no reputation condition (Figure 6.2).  
For each recalled name correctly associated with a conversation participants could 
score a point. We averaged scores from each two names of the same condition, so the 
maximum score for each condition was 1. ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
condition on the rate of name recall, F (3, 279) = 17.88, p < 0.001 (Figure 6.3). Name recall 
accuracy was the highest in the negative reputation condition, lower in the positive reputation 
condition and the lowest in the no reputation and non-social conditions (Figure 6.3). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Mean recall rate for names with 95% confidence intervals by condition. Participants were 
assigned a score of 1 if they recalled a name and associated it with the appropriate 
scenario. * p < 0.012 
Environment affected neither the content recall rates, F(2,93) = 2.19, p = 0.18, nor 
the name recall rates, F(2,93) = 0.29, p = 0.75. There were also no interactions between 
condition and environment either for content recall, F(6,279) = 1.40, p = 0.21, or for name 
recall, F(6, 279) = 1.34, p = 0.24. We found no relationships between the recall rate of 
conversations and familiarity with the discussed topic (all correlations non-significant).  
In the second step of the analysis, based on SVO scores participants were assigned 
to pro-social, pro-self and competitive types if they made six or more consistent choices of 
money distributions (for details see: Van Lange et al., 1997). A mixed 3(SVO 
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type)×4(condition) ANOVA was conducted using data from 20 competitive, 24 pro-self 
and 17 pro-social individuals (the data of participants who provided inconsistent choices 
were removed). There was no main effect of the SVO type on the content recall rate , F (2, 
58) = 0.62, p > 0.05 and no interaction between the SVO type and recall condition, F (6, 
174) = 0.81, p > 0.05. With regard to name recall rate, we found a main effect of SVO type 
F (2, 58) = 3.91, p < 0.05 (see Table 6.1 for descriptive statistics), but no interaction 
between SVO type and condition, F (6, 174) = 1.19, p > 0.05. Competitive types (M = 0.46, 
SD = 0.34) recalled significantly more names in general than pro-social types (M = 0.20, 
SD = 0.22), t(35) = -2.59, p < 0.05. 
Table 6.1 Means and standard deviations of name recall rate by SVO type. 
 SVO type 
 Pro-self Pro-social Competitive 
Negative reputation 0.69(0.55) 0.44(0.50) 0.65(0.61) 
Positive reputation 0.35(0.45) 0.18(0.35) 0.62(0.56) 
No reputation 0.25(0.62) 0.03(0.12) 0.30(0.44) 
Non-social 0.06(0.22) 0.18(0.35) 0.25(0.50) 
 
6.4. Discussion 
The fact that humans spend a considerable amount of time discussing social topics 
and the evidence that social information is transmitted with higher efficiency than non-
social information support the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar et al., 1997, Mesoudi et al., 
2006). However, if language, and in particular, gossip, serves to enhance social policing in 
complex groups, information about reputations should be attended to more than other 
types of social information. The social brain or the Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis 
emphasizes the manipulative potential of human cognition; hence, it is reasonable to expect 
that people evolved certain adaptations to allow them to indirectly monitor others (Dunbar, 
1998, Whiten, 2000, Byrne, 1996). Here we show that human memory is indeed sensitive to 
gossip about others‟ reputations. We found support for the stronger version of the social 
brain hypothesis, namely, conversations containing reputational information and the names 
of featuring characters, in particular the ones who violated social norms, were recalled with 
a higher accuracy than conversations with non-reputational social information. This result 
is in line with the findings of Wyer Jr et al. (1994) who observed that participants recalled 
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unfavourable behaviours of others which were mentioned in conversations better than 
favourable behaviours. 
Participants in our sample were exceptionally accurate at recalling the names of 
cheaters. In order to make a profitable decision of whether to engage in a relationship with 
someone, an individual does not need the entire detailed history of their cooperative 
behaviour; a parsimonious way of assigning reputation is to label an individual according to 
how they behaved in a recent interaction e.g.  „good‟ or „bad‟ and use a simple rule: avoid 
„bad‟ (see the literature on image scoring e.g. Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). Remembering 
names together with their reputation appears to be more relevant from an evolutionary 
perspective than storing information about the details of others‟ good or bad deeds. 
People‟s faces are the most distinctive individual characteristics hence it is reasonable to 
assign reputations to them (Verplaetse et al., 2007). However, when no faces are available 
e.g. when gossiping about unknown and unseen persons or when interacting online, names 
allow for quick identification of individuals. Our results indicate a cognitive sensitivity to 
names associated with reputations; thanks to this mechanism norm violators can be easily 
identified and avoided even without prior direct interaction with them. 
 Our results do not support Mesoudi et al.‟s (2006) findings in that the recall rates 
for social non-reputational information are not higher than for non-social information; in 
fact they are significantly lower. The lack of consistency between the two studies could be 
explained by the differences in the material used. In our study all material was presented in 
a conversational form even if it involved a non-social, technical description of some activity, 
while Mesoudi et al. presented the material as stories which were read by participants. The 
mere fact that two individuals exchanged information could have in itself made the 
technical content be perceived as social. Further, providing another individual with desired 
non-social information such as giving a recipe for a tasty cake or instructions how to fix a 
puncture (examples used in the conversations) might have been perceived as pro-social 
behaviour and might have increased the speaker‟s reputation and hence be recalled with a 
high accuracy. Alternatively, the conversation content in the non-social information 
condition could have been easier to reconstruct than other types of information that is: if 
someone remembered that the conversation concerned fixing a puncture, one could easily 
add what one knows from experience about this activity and by doing so report more 
information than was actually stored in memory from the conversation. The recall rate for 
names, which was lower for non-social than for reputational information, supports such an 
explanation.  
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High recall rate and accuracy for names associated with norm violators suggests 
that human cognitive skills are socially fine-tuned in order to minimize the risk of 
exploitation. The threat of spreading negative gossip can successfully facilitate cooperation 
especially when the potential gossiper can identify the subject of gossip (Piazza and Bering, 
2008). Our result does not mean however that gossip about negative reputations should be 
trusted more because of its veracity. As skilled Machiavellians people can manipulate gossip 
to defame others. Sommerfeld et al. (2008) showed that when presented with a few 
negative gossips about a potential partner, the variance in cooperative behaviour towards 
this partner was higher than when the gossip involved mixed positive and negative 
information. This indicates that despite the powerful impact of negative gossip on 
reputation, people do take into account the possibility of others acting spitefully and 
transmitting false information. 
Another objective of this study was to test between two competing hypotheses 
regarding the mechanism people use to effectively follow others‟ reputations by means of 
gossip. We did not find support for the idea that the cognitive sensitivity to reputational 
gossip depends on the cooperativeness of one‟s environment, as was shown by Barclay 
(2008) for face stimuli and as was postulated by Frank (1988). Priming with playing against 
a cooperative or uncooperative partner did not have any effect on the gossip recall rate. 
Our results are therefore more in line with the notion of the cheater detection module 
according to which sensitivity to norm violations is hard-wired and occurs regardless of 
individuals‟ cooperative experience (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992).  Although a general rule 
of attending to the rarer group would be a more cost-effective mechanism (Barclay, 2008), 
it is not likely that humans in their evolutionary history have ever lived in groups where the 
majority of group members were cheaters. Extensive cooperation among group members 
occurs even in „simple‟ hunter-gatherer societies which suggests it might have appeared 
very early in human evolutionary history (Hill et al., 2009). Moreover, it is probable that 
even if at some point cheaters started to dominate in a group, cooperative individuals 
would have decided to „walk away‟ and move to a more cooperative group (Aktipis, 2004). 
It has been shown that people tend to voluntarily move from a non-sanctioning and not 
very cooperative group to a group in which free-riders are punished and as a consequence 
cooperation is higher (Gürerk et al., 2006). 
Our results indicate that an individual‟s pro-social orientation is not related to recall 
of specific reputational information. However, we found that, overall, competitive types 
performed better at recalling names than pro-social types. Competitive types are not just 
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selfish, but strive to maximize the positive difference between their own and others‟ gain. 
Therefore, they might be more sensitive to the identities of individuals they compare 
themselves to. Unfortunately the present data do not allow for a more in-depth 
interpretation of this result and further research on is this topic is needed.  
The plethora of studies on indirect reciprocity (e.g. Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001, 
Milinski et al., 2002b) emphasizes the importance of reputations in human cooperative 
behaviour. The majority of these studies, however, focus on actions towards individuals 
observed to behave in a certain way. With large group sizes it is not possible to follow 
others‟ reputations by means of observation. Language enabled a more sophisticated and 
robust form of monitoring through passing reputational information. Gossip, therefore, 
may have played a crucial role in the evolution of human cooperation and deserves 
scientific investigation. Our study shows that reputational information is recalled with a 
greater accuracy than social non-reputational information and that the names of norm 
violators are attended to more than names associated with other contexts. Our results 
support the strong version of the social brain/Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis by 
showing that people have a memory bias for reputational gossip, in particular, gossip about 
norm violations and that this bias is not affected by the preceding experience of being 
exploited or helped. 
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7. The role of  Theory of  Mind in assessing 
trustworthiness 
 
People vary in the extent to which they can assess others‟ trustworthiness.  We investigated 
whether Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to represent mental states of others, is related 
to accuracy in recognizing cooperative intentions. Participants completed tasks measuring 
social-perceptual and social-cognitive ToM and were asked to assess photographs of people 
playing Prisoner‟s Dilemma games taken at the very moment when they were making a 
decision to cooperate or defect. We found no relationship between ToM and cooperative 
intention recognition. Surprisingly, in contrast to previous studies, participants in our 
sample performed poorly in the trustworthiness assessment tasks. Our results question 
human expertise at identifying cheaters and cooperators and indicate a lack of association 
between ToM and trustworthiness assessment. The findings are discussed from the 
perspective of an evolutionary arms race between reading and masking cooperative 
intentions. 
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7.1. Introduction 
Ultra-sociality and large scale cooperation towards unrelated individuals have been 
identified as potential driving forces behind the evolution of human-specific cognitive 
machinery (Dunbar, 2003, Moll and Tomasello, 2007, Hill et al., 2009). According to 
Dunbar (2003), increased group size and, in consequence, more complex social interactions 
often involving encounters with strangers put pressure on human cognitive capacities. Not 
being able to directly observe other individuals‟ actions creates a problem of how to keep 
track of free-riders. Free-riders undermine the stability of social systems by reaping the 
benefits without incurring any costs in cooperative interactions. The need to detect free-
riders and maintain high levels of cooperation could explain the existence of language 
(Dunbar, 1996), some of the pro-social emotions (Price et al., 2002), and socially oriented 
reasoning (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). 
Gathering reputational information about a potential partner can aid in predicting their 
cooperative intentions, assessing their trustworthiness and making a decision whether to 
engage in an interaction or not. However, individuals often meet strangers whose 
reputations are not known. In such circumstances, the only way to assess someone‟s 
trustworthiness is to read subtle cues of cooperative intentions from a face or interpret 
non-verbal body language. Evolutionary research shows that faces reveal important 
information about potential mates and social partners (e.g. Rhodes, 2006, Todorov et al., 
2008). Decisions about who to trust are affected by stable facial features e.g. attractiveness, 
similarity to kin or facial width (for a summary see Stirrat and Perrett, 2010). People also 
use others‟ facial expressions to determine cooperative intentions and, as reported by 
Verplaetse and colleagues (2007), after viewing photographs of individuals who played a 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma (PD) game, can correctly guess cooperative intentions with a 
probability higher than chance. In PD games players make simultaneous decisions whether 
to cooperate or defect. In a situation when one defects and the other one cooperates, the 
defector gains the maximum payoff while the cooperator receives a very small payoff or 
nothing. Therefore, individuals are tempted to defect by the high potential payoff and by 
the risk of being exploited. 
Theoretically, there could be two opposing evolutionary pressures acting on human 
cognition: one promoting cheater recognition and another one favouring masking 
uncooperative intentions (see Hanley et al., 2003). In fact, signals of cooperation might 
evolve to be deceptive in a similar way as it occurs in the mating context in animals e.g. 
some male crickets instead of a nutritionally valuable nuptial gift may offer a female an 
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empty silken balloon (Maynard Smith and Harper, 2003). The co-evolution of 
trustworthiness detection and disguising uncooperative intentions would result in an overall 
low ability to predict cooperative intentions (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979). However, a 
number of recent studies suggest that, despite a variation in the ability to predict others‟ 
cooperative behaviour, people perform at least better than chance when assessing others‟ 
trustworthiness (e.g. Verplaetse et al., 2007, Oda et al., 2009b, Fetchenhauer et al., 2010, 
Oda et al., 2009a, Brown et al., 2003, Frank et al., 1993) Could this variation be explained 
by between-individual differences in the Theory of Mind (ToM)? 
ToM is one of the dimensions of social intelligence and refers to the ability to read 
others‟ minds i.e. understanding and interpreting mental states of others. It consists of at 
least two components subserved by different neural mechanisms (Sabbagh, 2004). The 
social-perceptual component involves reading facial or body cues and from them 
representing others‟ thoughts and desires. In the classic task testing this skill participants 
have to visually assess an individual‟s mental state from a photograph of their eye region 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The social-cognitive component, on the other hand, describes 
the capacity to infer about the reasoning of others e.g. “I suppose he thinks…”. Social -
cognitive ToM can be represented hierarchically by using different levels of social 
embeddedness e.g. “I understand that you want me to believe that he thinks…”. The 
standard task measuring the social-cognitive component involves reading or listening to 
stories about characters socially interacting with each other.  Participants are then asked to 
answer questions about the characters‟ beliefs at different levels of social embeddedness 
(Stiller and Dunbar, 2007).  
Are there any grounds for expecting a positive relationship between ToM and the 
ability to assess cooperative intentions? A person with high ToM skills, by definition, 
should be able to infer about others‟ mental states pertaining to cooperative behaviour.  
The social-perceptual component of ToM appears to capture recognition of facial cues of 
trustworthiness particularly well. Cooperation and defection invoke certain emotions such 
as gratitude, liking, nervousness, shame or anger. Hence, the ability to recognize such 
emotions correctly might help in determining someone‟s cooperative intentions. Concealed 
emotions can be manifested as microexpressions lasting for 1/25-1/5 of a second (Ekman 
and Friesen, 1969) or slightly longer inconsistent emotional expressions (Porter and Brinke, 
2008). The proficiency in recognising emotions in general may translate to spotting any 
false or inconsistent emotions and, in consequence, the willingness to cheat. Alternatively, 
another cue of trustworthiness could be emotional expressiveness itself: cooperative 
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individuals display more both positive and negative emotions (Boone and Buck, 2003, 
Schug et al., 2010). Predicting other‟s cooperative behaviour could also be related to the 
social-cognitive component of ToM. In this case, however, it is more likely that individuals 
of high ToM skills would make more accurate trustworthiness judgements based on third-
party information (gossip) rather than on facial cues. 
 No previous studies have examined a possible relationship between ToM and 
trustworthiness recognition but some links have been found between ToM, pro-sociality 
and Machiavellianism. In preschoolers, children with more developed ToM (measured by 
the false-belief Sally-Anne task) were shown to have higher preferences for fairness 
(Takagishi et al., 2010). In adults, social-cognitive but not social-perceptual ToM positively 
correlated with the personality dimension of Agreeableness (Nettle and Liddle, 2008). 
Agreeableness reflects inter-individual differences in concern for others and highly 
agreeable people are considered as friendly, warm, cooperative and helpful (Graziano and 
Eisenberg, 1997). Paal and Bereczkei (2007) found a moderate positive relationship 
between the social-cognitive ToM  and pro-sociality, but no link between ToM and  
Machiavellianism (manipulative and exploitative strategy). Ali and Chamorro-Premuzic 
(2010) observed a negative association between social-perceptual ToM and 
Machiavellanism. In a similar vein, a negative relationship between both ToM components 
and Machiavellianism was reported by Lyons, Caldwell and Schultz (2010) who concluded 
that the need to manipulate and deceive conspecifics was not one of the driving forces 
behind the evolution of human social intelligence. It is possible that mind-reading ability in 
humans evolved not because it aided in deceiving others, but because it was needed in 
assessing trustworthiness of potential cooperation partners.  
Another interesting question relating to the assessment of cooperative intentions is 
whether individuals‟ own pro-sociality is associated with the accuracy in predicting 
cooperation in others. Oda et al. (2009b) suggested that, because altruists risk being 
exploited, their ability to accurately predict cooperative intentions of others should be 
higher than the ability of defectors. A similar prediction was made by Naganawa et al. 
(2010) who incorrectly linked the concept of „greenbeard effect‟ to human cooperation in 
expecting that “altruists can detect altruists easier than non-altruists” (p.2). The greenbeard effect 
assumes preferential assortment but not preferential recognition of individuals carrying the 
same cooperative gene (West et al., in press); the assortment can be facilitated e.g. by 
individuals with the cooperative gene occupying the same environment (Hamilton, 1975). 
Detecting altruistic individuals can be as beneficial to altruists as to cheaters, because both 
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groups can maximize their payoff by interacting with altruists. Therefore, even if altruists 
could convey some cues of their behaviour via faces, there would be as strong an 
evolutionary pressure on cheaters as on other altruists to learn to detect them.  In support 
of such reasoning, neither Oda et al. (2009b) nor Naganawa (2010) found any association 
between individuals‟ own altruism and the accuracy of recognizing altruism in others. 
This study examined the possible role of social intelligence in trustworthiness 
assessment. We administered both the social-perceptual and social-cognitive ToM 
measures and additionally examined participants‟ pro-social orientation. Participants were 
presented with photographs of people who cooperated or defected in a PD game and were 
asked to guess their decisions. We predicted that social-perceptual ToM would be positively 
associated with cooperative intentions recognition. Based on research highlighting human 
sophistication in guessing cooperative intentions, we expected that participants would be 
able to correctly assign cooperative intentions with a probability higher than chance. Finally, 
considering Oda‟s et al. results (2009b) we predicted that more cooperative individuals 
would not be more accurate at identifying cooperative intentions. 
7.2. Method 
7.2.1. Participants 
We collected data from 100 students: 15 males (mean age = 21.6, SD = 3.90) and 
84 females (mean age = 19.7, SD = 2.41); the sex and age of one participant was unknown. 
In the analysis only data from English native speakers or non-native speakers who spent at 
least one year in the UK were used (99 participants). Students were asked to do the study in 
a computer cluster after they finished their class in research methods. The tasks, presented 
in a random order using Qualtrics survey software, took approximately 40 minutes to 
complete and the students were rewarded for their time with course credits.  
7.2.2. Materials 
Social-cognitive ToM task - an updated version of the task used by Stiller and Dunbar (2007) 
Participants were asked to listen to a set of five short stories describing social 
situations (e.g. about a woman trying to receive a wage increase from her boss) and answer 
ten memory questions (true or false) after each story was presented. Five questions 
referring to different levels of embeddedness were mixed with five questions about the 
factual content of the story. ToM questions involved between two (e.g. „Emma wanted 
more money.‟) and six (e.g. „Emma believed that Jenny hoped that her boss, the 
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greengrocer, would believe Emma‟s claim about the chemist wanting to offer her a job.‟) 
levels of embedding. The questions pertaining to factual events also involved different 
levels of complexity and were included in order to control for the participant‟s 
understanding of complex sentences. The stories were recorded by a professional actor in a 
sound-proof cabin. For analysis we calculated the number of correctly answered ToM and 
factual questions in all stories. 
 Reading the mind in the eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al, 2001)  
Participants were required to match each of 36 pictures of pairs of eyes to one of 
four words depicting complex emotions. Participants were provided with instructions, 
including a glossary for the terms used to describe the emotions. Each correct response 
scored a point.  The test has been used as a measurement of affective ToM capacity in both 
clinical and non-clinical populations (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
 Assessing trustworthiness of faces (Verplaetse et al., 2007) 
Participants were presented with a set of 26 photographs used as stimuli in a 
previous study (Verplaetse et al., 2007, see Appendix D for examples). The photographs 
depicted faces and torsos of Belgian students who had played a PD game. The 
photographs were taken at the very moment when the students were making a decision to 
cooperate or defect. Participants were first familiarized with the PD game and had to pass a 
comprehension test in order to proceed. Then, the photographs of 13 cooperat ive (nine 
male and 4 female) and 13 uncooperative (seven male and six female) faces were presented 
to them in a random order, each accompanied with a question asking whether the 
photographed person cooperated or defected.  
Social Value Orientation Scale (SVO) (Van Lange et al., 1997) 
Participants were asked to choose one of the three presented options of sharing a 
sum of money between them and another person. The options included a fair share, and 
two unequal shares, one in which a participant would receive the highest payoff in 
comparison to other options, and another one in which the positive difference between a 
participant‟s and the other person‟s payoff would be highest. The options represented 
respectively the pro-social, pro-selfish and competitive orientation. Participants had to 
make a decision nine times, each time being presented with different values in a different 
order. Participants were classified as: cooperators, individualists or competitors depending 
on the number of choices made in each category. Only if participants‟ choices were 
consistent (at least seven choices of the same category) were they included in the analysis of 
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the effect of SVO on ToM skills or trustworthiness assessment. For other analyses, sample 
sizes of other variables were not reduced to the value of sample size for SVO. 
7.3. Results 
In order to satisfy the assumption of normal distribution scores for trustworthiness 
assessment were square rooted and scores for the Eyes test were cubed. Scores for the 
social-cognitive and social-perceptual component of ToM were significantly higher than 
chance, t(98) = 29.51, p < 0.001 and  t(98) = 20.11, p < 0.001 respectively (see Table 7.1 
for descriptive statistics). Scores for trustworthiness assessment differed from chance but 
in an unexpected direction: participants accurately identified cooperative intentions with a 
probability significantly lower than chance, t(98) = -2.01, p < 0.05. Theoretically, it is 
possible that people have a bias in categorising others as trustworthy or untrustworthy 
irrespective of the actual cooperative status of the person who is being judged. In order to 
test whether such a bias existed in our sample, a one-sample t-test was conducted to 
determine whether individuals were more likely to categorise others as cheaters than 
cooperators. Participants, who had not known that there was the same number of 
cooperative and defecting faces in the presented set, were not biased to categorise faces as 
cheaters or cooperators, t(98) = 0.61, p > 0.05.  
Anecdotally, women are more pro-social, charitable and empathic than men but a 
recent study showed that male and female pro-social behaviour depends on the stakes 
involved and that the question of which sex is fairer cannot be easily answered (Andreoni 
and Vesterlund, 2001). Nevertheless, we tested whether male and female faces are 
perceived differently. Due to unequal sex distribution in the stimuli we calculated the 
proportion of male and female faces identified correctly i.e. the correct score for each sex 
was divided by the total number of photographs of each sex. We then compared these 
proportions with a Wilcoxon test and found no difference in accuracy when judging male 
(Med = 0.5) or female (Med = 0.5) faces, z(98) = -0.44, p > 0.05. We also investigated 
whether there is any bias to perceive women as more pro-social. Again, we calculated the 
proportions of female and male faces identified as cooperative (irrespective of whether the 
identification was correct) and compared these proportions with a Wilcoxon test. We 
found that female faces (Med = 0.6) were perceived as cooperative more often than male 
faces (Med = 0.44), z(98) = -7.25, p < 0.01 (see Figure 7.1). This result is conservative as 
there was a smaller proportion of female faces (4/10) than male faces (9/16). 
Neither the social-cognitive nor the social-perceptual ToM score correlated with 
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the ability to assess trustworthiness (r(97) = 0.04, p > 0.05 and r(97)= -0.04, p > 0.05 
respectively, see Figure 7.2). Analogous analyses investigating the relationship between 
ToM scores and the assessment of (separately) cooperative and defecting faces provided 
the same results. Participants of different SVO categories (21 competitors, 33 individualists 
and 31 cooperators) did not differ with regard to how accurate they were in identifying 
cooperative intentions, F(2, 82) = 0.08, p > 0.05. 
Table 7.1 Mean scores (M) with standard deviations (SD) for the tasks used in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Figure 7.1 Boxplots presenting median proportions of male and female faces perceived as 
cooperative (with quartiles, extreme values and outliers).  
 
Task M(SD) Range 
Maximum 
possible score 
 
Social-cognitive ToM 
(intentionality score) 
 
19.68(2.42) 
 
11-24 
 
25 
Social-cognitive ToM 
(memory score) 
20.37(1.95) 15-24 25 
Social-perceptual ToM 
(Eyes test) 
27.57(3.95) 10-35 36 
Trustworthiness 
assessment 
12.99(2.80) 8-19 26 
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We investigated whether being distrustful in general (measured by the number of 
faces out of 26 identified as defectors irrespective of whether the identification was correct 
or not) is related to ToM abilities or SVO. There was no correlation between being 
distrustful and either the social-cognitive ToM score (r(97)= 0.10, p > 0.05), or the social-
perceptual ToM score, (r(97) = 0.02, p > 0.05).  Various SVO types did not differ from 
each other in terms of distrustfulness, F(2, 82) = 0.17, p > 0.05. 
 
                         
Figure 7.2 Relationship between participants’ scores on ToM scales and trustworthiness assessment. 
For a better visual representation the values were standardized. 
 
We can confidently reject the experimental hypothesis of the relationship between 
ToM and trustworthiness assessment. The likelihood of making a Type II error was small. 
Using a power calculator we estimated that with our sample size and the anticipated 
medium effect size (0.15) the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis was over 90%.  
7.4. Discussion 
A number of recent reports stress human ability to predict others‟ cooperative 
behaviour from immediately available facial and bodily cues (e.g. Verplaetse et al., 2007, 
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Fetchenhauer et al., 2010, Oda et al., 2009b). Here, we demonstrate that assessing 
trustworthiness is not always such an easy task. Participants did not show proficiency in 
identifying cooperators and defectors. Also in real life people seem to make many mistakes 
in predicting someone‟s cooperative behaviour. In a British TV show „Golden Balls‟ 
contestants play a variation of a Prisoner‟s Dillemma game competing for sometimes large 
sums of money (up to £100 000). Data from 281 episodes of the „Golden Balls‟ game 
demonstrate that in  44.1%  of episodes one player decided to cooperate while the other 
one defected (Van den Assem et al., 2010). Clearly, cooperators in those pairs failed to 
guess what their partner would do and misinterpreted cues of defection.  
Although we used the same stimuli as Verplaetse et al. (2007), participants in our 
sample did not identify cooperative intentions with a probability higher than chance. One 
possible reason for this difference is the fact that we used only event-related photographs 
whereas in Verplaetse et al.‟s study participants could see each face in three contexts: 
neutral, practice round and proper round. Perhaps it is necessary for people to see how an 
event-related face varies from the neutral face in order to pick cues of cooperation or 
deception. Because humans evolved surrounded by moving and not static faces of others, 
being able to assess biological motion may contribute to the accuracy of distinguishing 
cooperators from defectors. Movement has been shown to play a role in assessing traits 
important in mate choice (e.g. Brown et al., 2005), so it could also affect the way in which 
people perceive partners for cooperative interactions. As demonstrated by Brown et al., 
(2003) smiling and expressions under involuntary control, which could be observed in 
videos, were more typical of altruists than non-altruists. 
The difficulty in assessing cooperative intentions might also have been caused by 
the ambiguous motives for defection in the one-shot PD. An individual can decide to 
defect in order to gain the whole reward (in which case he deserves to be called a cheater) 
or because of caution and in order not to receive the sucker‟s payoff. Our results support 
other reports in which assessments of honesty in faces were not related to real honesty 
(Zebrowitz et al., 1996). Conceptually, under the assumption that people can accurately 
distinguish cooperative types, defectors should almost disappear from the population 
because no one would be willing to interact with them. 
The main aim of the study was to examine a potential link between ToM and the 
ability to assess trustworthiness. More specifically, we predicted a positive relationship 
between the social-perceptual component of ToM and the number of correct guesses of 
cooperative intentions. Our data suggest that no such link exists. There can be a simple 
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reason for this result. If, as we showed, people are not capable of picking cues of deception 
and cooperation, that is, if they simply guess with a probability of a correct guess lower 
than chance, it is not surprising that such guessing does not correlate with ToM skills. 
Alternatively, the hypothesis that mind reading ability in humans evolved in order 
to predict cooperative intentions of anonymous individuals might still be valid under the 
assumption of a continuous arms race between the ability of cheaters to remain invisible 
and the ability of others to detect them. This arms race can be driving evolution even if at 
any point in time no one side is on top. High social intelligence could promote both 
reading and masking cues of deception. Such an interpretation would support the lack of 
the ability to assess trustworthiness that we report. Finally, ToM may not play such an 
important role in cooperative interactions as we expected. It has been shown that 
economic behaviour of autistic children in whom ToM skills are impaired does not differ 
dramatically from the behaviour of normally developing children (Sally and Hill, 2006). 
Perhaps the optimal strategies for playing PD and bargaining games are relatively 
independent of ToM skills. 
As expected, and congruent with Oda et al.‟s (2009b) and Naganawa et al.‟s (2010) 
results, we found no evidence for a relationship between one‟s own pro -sociality and the 
ability to recognize cooperative individuals. The presence of such a relationship would be 
surprising because it would imply that the incentive for cooperators to detect other 
cooperators is greater than the incentive for defectors to detect cooperators. Interestingly , 
we found that female faces were categorized as cooperative more often than male faces. 
The opinion that women act more pro-socially than men was expressed early by Darwin 
(1871) and later supported by numerous studies (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 1998). 
Although it was recently shown that the relationship between sex and cooperation is not 
straightforward (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), perceptions of a person‟s cooperative 
intentions can be influenced by the social expectations relating to gender roles and the 
mass media enforcing gender stereotypes (Hyde, 2005). Our result supports that of 
Fetchenhauer et al. (2010) but should be treated with caution because our stimulus set 
contained more male than female faces. 
In summary, our study questions human proficiency in recognizing cooperative 
intentions. The consequence of this inability may be the lack of a relationship between 
ToM and trustworthiness assessment. We believe our results are important in that they 
encourage caution when categorically asserting that humans can identify cooperative 
intentions. Such findings are exciting and attractive, therefore might receive more attention 
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and publicity than non-significant results which are likely to suffer from the file drawer 
problem (Møllerand and Jennions, 2001, Rosenthal, 1979). Our findings should be treated 
seriously, considering that we had the statistical power to detect any effect. An interesting 
direction for future research would be to explore the arms race hypothesis which points to 
the co-evolution of interpreting and masking cooperative intentions. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
8.1. Summary of results and implications 
The main aim of the PhD project described in this thesis was to empirically test and 
explore the theory of competitive altruism (CA). Research on reputation-based cooperation 
has been dominated by the theory of indirect reciprocity (IR) which, as I explained in detail 
in Chapter 2, (1) does not account for unconditional cooperation, (2) is less likely to evolve 
due to its complexity and (3) suffers from problems in assigning reputational scores.  In 
this thesis, I demonstrated that CA is a strong alternative to IR in terms of explaining 
cooperative behaviour. More broadly, I highlighted that reputation-based theories of 
cooperation could be applied to numerous instances of human interactions and therefore 
deserve as much attention as the traditional theories of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971).  
In summary, in support of CA I showed in Chapter 3 that cooperative behaviour is 
affected by reputational incentives. The more opportunities one has to use reputation in a 
profitable way, the more one is willing to invest in it. In the light of this finding, 
cooperation constitutes absolutely rational and strategic behaviour. In line with the 
assumptions of CA I also found that the initial cost of cooperation is recouped in the long-
term when individuals reap benefits from the privileged access to desirable social partners 
and profitable interactions with them. My results concur with those of mainstream 
economics showing that people tend to maximize their average payoffs (Camerer, 2003). 
Typically, maximizing income would be a result of selfishness; however, when reputation is 
at stake, it actually pays to cooperate. People appear to renounce immediate benefits and 
maximize their payoffs by long-term rewards coming from cooperation.  
In Chapter 4 I demonstrated how differences in the relative cost of reputational 
investments arise in the context of unequal resources. I interpreted the high relative cost of 
cooperation incurred by low-resources individuals as a result of the CA setting. In their 
paper Barclay and Willer (2007) wrote “Competitive altruism occurs when people go beyond 
attempting to merely appear generous and instead actively try to be more altruistic than one another, and 
this has yet to be unambiguously demonstrated” (p.749) and later “this study provides the only 
unambiguous evidence to date for the existence of competitive altruism in humans and shows that partner 
choice is one way to produce competitive altruism” (p.752). I would argue that the experiment 
presented in Chapter 4 supports the first statement to a greater extent than Barclay and 
Willer‟s study in which they only varied the reputational incentives (see  Chapter 3 for 
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details). In my experiment, the only way for low-resource participants to compete in a 
market for partners was to spend a substantial proportion of their allocation.  In an attempt 
to „try to be more altruistic than one another‟, knowing about their resource handicap, the poorest 
participants made the costliest investments in reputation, in relative terms. The results of 
this study emphasize the strategic nature of human cooperation. Moreover, they unravel 
the mechanisms of partner choice in showing that, at least in some circumstances, people 
devote more attention to the relative rather than absolute cost of a cooperative investment.  
In Chapter 5 I compared the efficiency of CA and IR in maintaining cooperation in 
social dilemmas. Previously, it has been demonstrated that the possibility of punishment 
enhances cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). However, results of a more recent cross-
cultural study suggest that in regions with high levels of anti-social punishment maintaining 
cooperation via punishment is thwarted by those who punish pro-social individuals 
(Herrmann et al., 2008). This raises a question of how large-scale cooperation in such 
groups can be sustained. Reputation building is one possible mechanism to solve this 
problem. Milinski et al. (2002b) proposed that IR can re-establish cooperation after a 
decline. My results indicate that CA is a more powerful reputational mechanism in 
maintaining cooperation than IR. Moreover, I found that the opportunity of forming long-
term partnerships positively affects cooperation. 
Research presented in Chapters 3-5 stands in contrast to the view of some 
economists arguing that human cooperation is driven by other-regarding preferences. 
These economists frequently use terms such as „altruism‟ and „strong reciprocity‟ e.g. 
“human altruism extends far beyond reciprocal altruism and reputation-based cooperation, taking the form 
of strong reciprocity” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, p.785). I do not deny that some form of 
altruism may exist. In repeated PGG games 90% of participants free-ride at the end 
(Camerer, 2003). Hence, 10% of participants cooperate despite others exploiting them. In 
Kurzban and Houser‟s (2005) sample 13% of participants were categorized as strict 
cooperators in contrast to defectors and reciprocators. The aim of the research I conducted 
was to explore the role of reputation-based cooperation. Although some people do 
cooperate no matter what, the majority is influenced by reputational incentives. Given the 
high levels of cooperation reputation building can evoke, it should be considered as an 
equally robust mechanism as the traditional theories explaining the evolution of 
cooperation in humans. 
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Considering the role of reputations in human cooperation highlighted in Chapters 
2-5 it is reasonable to expect that, in comparison to non-reputational information, people 
(1) devote more attention to reputational information, (2) store it more effectively or/and 
(3) retrieve it more easily from memory. In Chapter 6 I tested whether people have any bias 
in the recall of reputational information. Furthermore, I investigated which of the two 
possible mechanisms, cheater detection or rarity detection, is more likely to shape the way 
people remember gossip about individuals of different reputations. My findings give partial 
support to the hypothesis of a cognitive bias towards norm-violators. The results were 
confounded by an unexpected finding suggesting that people can recall as much 
information about non-social conversations as about conversations involving negative 
reputations. However, the recall rate of names associated with different actions fitted the 
trend expected under the assumption of the cheater detection hypothesis. My results 
suggest that people are biased to remember norm-violators better than those who abide by 
the rules of cooperation. Where exactly this bias comes from; selective attention, better 
storage or retrieval from memory remains an open question. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 I investigated a possible link between Theory of Mind (ToM) 
capacity and the ability to recognise cooperative intentions from faces. In contrast to the 
intuitive hypothesis that these two skills would be related mainly because of the emotional 
component involved in both interpreting others‟ mental states and cooperative intentions, I 
found no evidence for a relationship between the two. Moreover, my results did not 
support previous reports suggesting high human proficiency in reading cooperative 
intentions from immediately available cues. A possible explanation for my findings is the 
evolutionary arms race between accurately guessing and effectively masking cooperative 
intentions. It is unlikely that emotions not relating to cooperation such as happiness, 
surprise or fear had to be masked frequently in the human evolutionary past and that such 
masking would yield considerable benefits. In contrast, successful masking of emotions 
relating to cooperation might have led to more profitable interactions. Even if interpreting 
cooperative intentions somehow associates with ToM, the pressure to mask cues of 
deception might have affected such a relationship. In the Discussion I stressed the 
importance of disseminating non-significant results in order to avoid the file drawer 
problem. 
In conclusion, the findings of this thesis provide interesting insights on human 
cooperation. The main advantage of research presented here is that it offers a new picture 
of human cooperative behaviour of high explanatory power. My framework incorporates 
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knowledge from different disciplines such as evolutionary psychology, social psychology, 
anthropology and behavioural economics. The results I obtained encourage treating 
reputation building behaviour as a robust mechanism shaping human cooperation.  
8.2. Limitations and future directions 
The results of my thesis suffer from several limitations. Most importantly, all 
experiments have been conducted with samples taken from student populations. According 
to Henrich et al. (2010) there may be dramatic behavioural differences between people 
from various societies. Because research on CA has started developing only recently, it is 
justified to test initial hypotheses using student participants (Gächter, 2010). To my 
knowledge there exists only one report of CA in the field. Macfarlan (2010) described 
labour exchange driven by CA occurring in a Dominican village. Labour spent on bay oil 
distillation predicted altruistic reputations. The larger the group size and in consequence 
the competition the more labour people offered which was interpreted as calibrating the 
cost of a cooperative signal based on its value (Macfarlan, 2010). Moreover, altruistic 
reputations predicted the number of reciprocal partnerships men formed, hence the 
benefits of CA translated not necessarily to the quality but the quantity of social partners. 
Reports like Macfarlan‟s (2010) deepen the experimental and theoretical knowledge and 
verify whether the proposed hypotheses can be applied to real-life situations.  Despite low 
external validity of my results, they capture some interesting mechanisms of reputation 
building under controlled conditions which would be difficult to observe outside the lab.  
The studies on CA described in this thesis would benefit from supporting the 
hypotheses with theoretical models. Hypotheses presented here were derived from the 
assumptions of CA, however, it has not been validated whether they are theoretically sound. 
For example, when considering the cost of cooperation, sending a costly signal may not 
always be the best strategy (Maynard Smith and Harper, 2003). Individuals should seek the 
ways of signalling that are honest and reliable enough to function as an advertisement but 
not more costly than that. If a signal has a quantitative nature (as it is with contributions) 
there may be some optimal contribution that informs participants about the 
cooperativeness of the signaller. One does not necessarily have to spend all of what they 
have in order to attract others; some smaller amount may be sufficient and less costly to 
the signaller. A theoretical model would help to investigate whether people optimize their 
costly investments. Another problem that requires theoretical approach is the evaluation of 
the two reputation-based mechanisms of cooperation, CA and IR.  My research suggests 
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that CA affects cooperation in social dilemmas to a greater extent than IR. However, it 
would be beneficial to have a model contrasting how these two work. Simulations would 
help to determine whether CA or IR is more likely to evolve and be more stable.  
The study described in Chapter 4 could benefit from another control. The 
relationship between heterogeneity in resources and reputation-based cooperation can be 
tackled from two perspectives. Either the CA setting affects how people behave in a social 
dilemma situation with heterogeneous resources, or the inequality in resources (e.g. the fact 
of having £10 rather than £20) affects individuals‟ reputation building behaviour. In the 
case of the former assumption, in order to test whether the behaviour of individuals with 
different resources is a result of the reputation building setting, it is necessary to compare it 
to a condition with an anonymous setting (e.g. studies cited in Chapter 4 such as Cress and 
Kimmerle, 2008). If we assume an inverse mechanism of causation, namely, that resource 
inequality affects reputation building behaviour, a control would entail three types of 
groups (£10, £15 and £20) with homogenous resources playing a social dilemma game in a 
reputation building setting. Including the latter control would eliminate the possibility that 
the high relative contributions of low-resource individuals observed in my study were not 
due to the willingness to outperform others, but were simply a result of being endowed 
with a higher or lower amount of money. Although unlikely, it might be argued that three 
low-resource individuals playing a PGG with each other would contribute proportionately 
more than three high-resource individuals. The extra control could be implemented to 
clarify that this is not the case. 
The results of the study described in Chapter 6 would be more reliable if there was 
another person naïve to the hypothesis assessing the information recalled by participants. 
My assessments and the assessments of the other person should be congruent in order to 
eliminate any experimental bias. If further resources were available I would spend them on 
employing a second assessor and making the procedure more rigorous. I would also be 
tempted to complement Chapter 7 with another experiment investigating personality 
characteristics of people who can effectively mask their cooperative intentions. 
Hypothetically, such people would have a higher incentive to cheat and might exhibit 
higher Machiavellian intelligence than those whose intentions are easily interpreted. 
Outperforming others in cooperation when reputation is at stake constitutes the 
central notion of CA. However, it has not yet been directly tested whether such altruistic 
competition exists. The experiment described in Chapter 4 provided indirect support for 
this notion, but in order to unequivocally verify whether people strive to be more 
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cooperative than others in contrast to being simply more cooperative in general I propose 
the following design. Participants play a repeated PGG but in each round the contribution 
decision of one randomly selected participant is delayed. While others make a simultaneous 
decision, one person is able to see their contributions before he/she decides how much to 
contribute. The design involves different conditions e.g. anonymous, knowledge and 
partner choice (compare to Chapter 2) so it is possible to observe in what way the 
randomly chosen players adjust their cooperation level to others‟ contributions. 
Alternatively, all participants contribute simultaneously, but before they make their decision, 
they are asked to indicate the average amount of money they expect the others in the group 
would contribute. If the amount of money contributed is higher than the observed 
contributions in the first proposed design or the average expected contributions in the 
second design, it is an evidence for reputational competition. Such experiments would 
unambiguously determine whether people try to outdo others in cooperative displays.  
Finally, an intriguing research topic is the relative importance of reward, 
punishment and reputation in human interactions. Previous studies have shown that 
reward (Rand et al., 2009), punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) and reputation (Milinski 
et al., 2002b; see also Chapter 5) can all enhance cooperation. It would be interesting to see 
which of the three mechanisms people are most willing to use in order to promote 
cooperation. Essentially, will people be willing to punish and reward in a situation when 
cooperation is driven by reputations that bring long-term profits? My guess is that 
cooperation based on reputation would be sufficient to discourage free-riding and there 
would be no need to resort to positive or negative sanctions. A recent report indicates that 
altruistic punishment does not solve the „tragedy of the commons‟ in some countries 
(Herrmann et al., 2008) suggesting that another, more robust mechanism is required to 
explain large-scale cooperation. I consider reputation building as a promising candidate. 
In sum, my thesis answers some novel research questions pertaining to reputation-
based cooperation but it also points to challenging research directions and calls for a cross-
cultural study of reputation building behaviour. 
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Appendix A  
An example of instructions participants could see in the screen in the study described in 
Chapter 3. 
 
102 
 
Appendix B 
Details of the procedure 
 
Participants did the experiment in groups of four; there were six two-male-two-
female groups, three all-female groups, six three-male-one-female groups and five three-
female-one-male groups. Participants started the experiment by filling out a demographics 
questionnaire and reading about the three games they would play: group game, one-way 
game and two-way game. Participants learned that they would have a starting account of 
300 lab pounds (£6 real pounds). For each round participants would be able to spend 
between £0-10. As there were 30 rounds in each experimental session (which participants 
did not know) it was not possible to go bankrupt before the end. Participants were told 
that the experiment would take between 30 and 45 minutes. Participants read the 
instructions for each game and answered test questions (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 Instructions for the three games used in the experiment 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
To ensure that participants understood the instructions they had to read, scenarios 
were presented in which players contributed/donated different amounts of money and 
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participants then had to calculate their profits. For each game participants were presented 
with two different scenarios, e.g. in the group game a scenario describing a very 
cooperative group and one describing a group with free-riders. For the one- and two-way 
games participants had to answer questions about the profits of two players who 
transferred the same amount of money to others and two players with unequal payoffs (see 
Figure 2). The order of scenarios was counter-balanced across the games. Participants 
could use a calculator provided by the software Z-Tree to calculate the outcomes of the 
hypothetical games. If they inserted an incorrect response a message appeared on the 
screen informing them about the mistake and reminding them about the rules of the game 
and how the payoffs should be calculated. In the very rare cases when participants kept 
inserting an incorrect response one of the researchers (K.S.) approached them and 
explained the problem. After the training stage participants had an opportunity to raise a 
hand and ask a question if anything was still unclear to them but no one ever used this 
opportunity. 
Figure 2 An example of a test question for the two-way game 
 
Next, depending on the condition, participants were told that they would play (a) 
several rounds of the group game, (b) several rounds of the group game each alternated 
with rounds of the two-way game, (c) several rounds of the group game each alternated 
with rounds of the one-way game, (d) several rounds of the group game each followed by 
four rounds of the one-way game, (e) several rounds of the group game each followed by 
four rounds of the two-way game. Hence, participants did not know how many rounds of a 
certain combination of games they would play. 
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Appendix C 
Examples of conversation scripts used in the study described in Chapter 6. 
a) NEGATIVE REPUTATION 
A: Have I told you about Jenny? 
B: No, what did she do?  
A: We went to the restaurant yesterday and everything was fine until the waiter turned up 
with a bill. She excused herself saying she has to go to the bathroom and disappeared. 
Eventually I paid for her dinner. 
b) POSITIVE REPUTATION 
A: Have you heard about Alex? 
B: No, what‟s new about him? 
A: I met him in a bank this week. He donated his earnings from the last month to a charity 
organisation. He wants to help poor children. He said he would like to establish a 
charity organisation by himself. 
c) NO REPUTATION SOCIAL 
A: You know that Martin‟s sick. 
B: Yeah, I heard about it. What is it exactly? 
A: I visited him in the hospital yesterday. He said he simply lost consciousness when he 
was walking back home. They are doing some tests to find out the reason but the doctor 
could not tell me anything. 
d) NON-SOCIAL 
A: And? Do you like it? 
B: It‟s delicious! Is it difficult to make? 
A: You simply take eggs and separate the yolks from whites. Then you mix the yolks with 
flour, sugar, and ginger.  Preheat the oven and bake it for 15 minutes. I also add some 
powdered sugar at the end. 
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Appendix D 
An example of photographs used in the study described in Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
A person who defected in the PD game. 
 
 
 
    A person who cooperated in the PD game. 
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